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Abstract
TAXES AND DIVIDEND POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY
Chinwe Edna Nweke 
Old Dominion University, 1994 
Director: Dr. Bruce Seifert
The tax effects hypothesis states that dividends have a negative impact 
on the value of a firm due to the preferential treatment given to capital gains 
over dividend income in some countries. This study tests the tax effects 
hypothesis in five countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan and United 
States. The countries are selected because each had a significant tax law 
change within the period of study (1983-1991) and therefore provides an 
excellent opportunity for validation of this hypothesis.
The tax effects hypothesis is tested by first examining the effects of tax 
law changes on dividend payout ratios and then by studying the relationship 
between expected return and dividend yield before and after a tax law change 
in each country. A modified Capital Asset Pricing Model is used in examining 
this relationship.
Dividend payout ratios, dividend yields and dividend growth rates are 
calculated for each country to check if there are significant differences across
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countries. The final section of the study uses data in the five countries to test
Lintner’s partial adjustment model.
The results show that
1. There are some significant differences in payout ratios between the 
countries. The Australian and German firms have the highest dividend 
payout ratios while the French firms have the lowest dividend payout 
ratios. Australian firms also have the highest dividend yields and growth 
rates while Japanese firms have the lowest dividend yields and growth 
rates.
2. The post tax law dividend payout ratios of countries that increased the 
tax disadvantage of dividend income generally decreased. While the 
direction of the change in payout ratios supports the tax effects 
hypothesis, the amount of the change is insignificant in some cases.
3. A positive relationship between expected return and dividend yield is 
observed in countries that have higher effective tax rates on dividend 
income than capital gains. The relationship between expected return and 
dividend yield is positive and significant in France, Germany (after the tax 
law change), Japan and United States. An insignificant relationship is 
observed in countries that have similar tax rates on dividend income and 
capital gains. This is true for Australia and Germany (before the tax law 
change). These results suggest that dividends have a negative impact 
on the value of a firm and are consistent with the tax effects hypothesis.
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4. Dividend behavior of firms in the countries can be explained by Lintner’s 
model. The calculated payout ratios for Australia, France and U.S. are 
similar to the actual payout ratios. The calculated payout ratios for 
Germany and Japan are lower than the actual payout ratios but are 
within the calculated range of the payout ratios. Australia and Germany 
have the highest speed of adjustments among the five countries.
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Chapter 1
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
I. Introduction
The effect of dividend policy on the value of a firm continues to be a 
controversial topic in finance. The irrelevancy theory made popular by 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) says that in a perfect market, the dividend policy of 
a firm given its investment policy is irrelevant to the value of the firm. The 
relevancy theory says that dividends have an effect on the value of a firm, but 
there is no consensus on the nature or the source of this valuation effect.
The "bird-in-hand" fallacy says that investors’ need for current income or 
dislike for uncertainty causes a firm’s stock price to be positively related to its 
current dividend. This argument suggests that dividends have a positive effect 
on the value of a firm.
The information effects hypothesis also suggests that dividends have a 
positive effect on the value of a firm. However, the positive effect in this case 
results from information asymmetry between investors and managers. 
Managers use dividend payments to inform investors about the earnings 
prospects of a firm.
1
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The tax effects hypothesis, however, indicates that dividends have a 
negative impact on the value of a firm if dividends are taxed at a higher rate 
than capital gains. The negative impact arises from the differential tax treatment 
between dividend income and capital gains in countries that tax dividends at a 
higher rate. Wealth maximizing investors therefore demand higher returns from 
stocks that pay high dividends as a compensation for the higher taxes paid.
II. Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research is to examine the tax effects hypothesis in 
five countries namely Australia, France, Germany, Japan and United States. 
These countries are selected because of the unique tax systems they adopted 
and because each had a significant tax law change within the period of study, 
1983-1991. These tax law changes provide a unique opportunity for evaluating 
the validity of the tax effects hypothesis. This is achieved by first examining the 
effects of a tax law change on dividend payout ratios and then by studying the 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield before and after the tax 
law change in each country. The final section of this study uses data in the five 
countries to test Lintner’s partial adjustment model.
III. Importance of the Study and Statement of the Problem
Dividend policies of firms are very important because of their significant 
impact in the private and business sectors. A major objective of shareholders
2
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and management is maximization of shareholder’s wealth. If dividend policy 
affects the value of a firm, it is only rational that shareholders and management 
should strive to adopt the dividend policy that maximizes the value of the firm.
A firm’s dividend policy is also important to shareholders because dividend 
income is a major source of income to some investors. These investors are 
therefore affected by the dividend policies adopted by firms.
Firms’ dividend policies can also affect the economy. Retained earnings 
constitute a major source of long-term growth in many corporations and 
retained earnings are affected by dividend policies. Dividend policies can 
therefore have a stabilizing effect on the economy through its effect on the long­
term growth of firms. This is especially true if external financing is unavailable 
or limited.
However, there is no conclusive evidence on the effect of dividend policy 
on the value of a firm. The irrelevancy theory says that dividend policy does 
not affect the value of a firm. The information effects hypothesis suggests that 
dividends have a positive effect on the value of a firm while the tax effects 
hypothesis says that dividends have a negative effect on the value of a firm (see 
literature review in Chapter 2). These contradictory hypotheses leave an 
important question in corporate finance still unanswered. Is the dividend policy 
of a firm relevant or irrelevant to the value of the firm?
One common problem with previous dividend studies is the difficulty of 
controlling for other relevant factors while examining the effects of dividend
3
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policy on the value of a firm. This study minimizes this problem by working with 
countries that changed their tax system within the period of study. The 
relationship between dividend policy and the value of the firm is examined 
before and after a tax law change using the same group of firms.
Scarcity of data has also limited research in international dividend 
policies. The few international dividend studies that are in the literature do not 
specifically address valuation effects. This work adds to the literature by 
evaluating the tax effects hypothesis and by providing comparative dividend 
analysis on five countries including the U.S.
The world capital markets are becoming more integrated. Foreign 
markets are opening up to international investors. Companies are listing their 
stocks in foreign markets. Investors are now able to invest in foreign stocks at 
reasonable costs and with less government interference. These recent 
developments have necessitated the expansion of our knowledge on the 
relationship between dividend policy and the value of a firm in other economies. 
It is therefore important that dividend policies of other countries be studied.
IV. Scope of the Work
This study is directed at the following questions:
1. Are there significant differences in average dividend payout ratios, 
dividend yields and dividend growth rates between Australia, France, 
Germany, Japan and United States?
4
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2. What are the effects of a tax law change on dividend payout ratios in 
each country?
3. Can the tax effects hypothesis be used to explain the relationship 
between dividend policy and the value of a firm?
4. Can Lintner’s partial adjustment model be used to describe dividend 
behavior of firms in the five countries?
V. Theoretical Framework
A firm’s dividend policy determines what proportion of the company’s 
profit is paid out to shareholders. A firm can have a policy of paying all, none 
or a fraction of its earnings as dividends. Different hypotheses have been used 
to explain the effect of dividend policy (if any) on the value of a firm. The 
different hypotheses are discussed in the next section.
The Irrelevancy theory says that in a perfect market, the dividend policy 
of a corporation, given its investment policy, has no effect on its stock price. 
This means that dividends are irrelevant to the value of the firm. Modigliani and 
Miller (M & M) 1961 support the irrelevancy theory by deriving an equation that 
gives the value of a firm as:
Tr##.x _ NOI^t+l) - i ^ t + i )  + v ^ t + i )
} i  + p ( t + D   1
where V,(t) is the market value of the firm in period t,
NOI,(t+1) is the random future cash flows from operations for
5
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the ith firm at time (t+1),
l,(t+1) is the investment outlay for the ith firm at time (t+1),
V,(t+1) is the value of the firm at time (t+1) and 
p(t+1) is the market-required rate of return at time (t+1).
This equation implies that neither dividends nor any variable that affects 
dividends are relevant in the valuation of a firm. The value of a firm is the 
discounted value of future earnings. Dividends do not affect earnings and 
therefore should not affect the value of a firm. The future earnings of a firm 
depend on previous investment decisions.
The assumptions underlying this irrelevancy argument are:
1. There are no taxes. Rims’ earnings are not subject to corporate or
persona] taxes.
2. There are no transaction costs. Shareholders can easily buy or sell
shares without incurring any transaction costs.
3. There are no agency problems. The separation of management and
ownership is no problem because management always acts in the best 
interest of the shareholders.
4. There is no information asymmetry. Management and shareholders have
access to the same information.
5. The investment and financing decisions of corporations are exogenous to 
dividend policy. A firm that pays out all its earnings can still carry out 
profitable investments by borrowing from the capital market.
6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The opponents of the irrelevancy theory question the validity of these 
assumptions. Firms and investors pay taxes on their earnings; investors do not 
have the privilege of buying or selling shares without incurring transaction costs; 
and sometimes there are conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders. Furthermore, investors and management do not always have 
access to the same information and even if they do, investors do not always 
understand the information they receive from the financial market Finally,
M & M’s assumption that investment decisions are independent of dividend 
policy has also been questioned. Adoption of residual dividend policy by some 
firms (whereby all positive Net Present Value projects are financed before any 
dividends are paid), implies that investment and dividend policy decisions are 
not completely independent of each other. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
firms prefer to finance new investment with internal funds instead of external 
funds that would expose the firm to scrutinies of the capital market This 
suggests that there are some interactions between dividend policies, investment 
policies and other financing policies. These doubts led to the advancement of 
other hypotheses such as the information effect hypothesis, agency cost 
hypothesis, and tax effects hypothesis in addition to the existing “bird-in-hand“ 
fallacy.
The "bird-in-hand" fallacy suggests that the need for current income or 
resolution of uncertainty causes a firm's stock price to be positively related to its 
current dividend. Firms that pay high dividends attract investors and the
7
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increased demand for shares drives up stock prices. This implies that current 
dividends are better than uncertain future capital gains that may never be 
realized. This view was prevalent before Modigliani and Miller (1961).
The information asymmetry hypothesis says that dividends are relevant 
because they are used by management to communicate privileged information 
about a firm’s performance to shareholders. It is the expectation of higher 
current or future earnings that raises stock prices and not necessarily 
shareholders’ preference for high dividends.
The Agency theory uses the conflict of interest between owner-managers 
and outside investors to explain the valuation effects of dividends. Rozeff 
(1982) suggests that an optimal dividend policy can be explained by a trade-off 
between floatation costs of raising external capital and the benefit of reduced 
agency costs. Agency cost arises when prospective investors charge, ex ante, 
for the possibility that owner-managers may increase their personal wealth 
through perquisites at the expense of investors. Owner-managers sometimes 
choose to minimize these agency costs by incurring monitoring costs if such 
costs are less than what prospective investors charge.
The tax effects hypothesis says that dividends have a negative impact on 
the value of a firm. The basis of this argument is the differential tax treatment 
between dividend income and capital gains. In countries where dividend 
income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, investors in some tax 
brackets may not maximize their after-tax return if they earn dividend income.
8
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These investors therefore demand higher returns as a compensation for the 
higher taxes paid on dividend income. This implies that high dividends have a 
negative effect on the value of a firm. This study focuses on the validation of 
the tax effects hypothesis.
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Chapter 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The literature review is divided into four sections:
1. Country comparative dividend studies
2. Effects of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios
3. Tax effects hypothesis on the value of a firm and
4. Behavioral dividend partial adjustment models.
I. Country Comparative Dividend Studies
Two studies that compare dividend policies of different countries are 
Khoury and Smith (1977) and Michel and Shaked (1986). Khoury and Smith 
compare the dividend policies of Canadian and U.S. firms. They conclude that 
U.S. firms generally have higher payout ratios and dividend yields than 
Canadian firms. Michel and Shaked examine country and industry influences 
on dividend policies in Japan and U.S. They find that dividend yields of U.S. 
firms are generally higher than dividend yields of Japanese firms, while the 
dividend payout ratios of Japanese firms are higher than those of U.S. firms. 
These two studies indicate that there are differences in dividend payout ratios
10
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across countries.
II. The Effects of Tax Law changes on Dividend Pavout Ratios
Khoury and Smith (1977) examine the effects of the 1972 Canadian 
Fiscal Tax Reform Act on dividend policies of Canadian firms. The Fiscal 
Reform Act is a tax law change that introduced a capital gains tax and 
increased the dividend tax credit in Canada. This tax law change made 
dividends more attractive relative to capital gains for most investors. Khoury 
and Smith compare the pre and post tax law means of dividend growth rates 
and conclude that there is a significant difference between the two means. 
Dividend growth rates increased from a pre-law average of 5% to a post-law 
average of 10.01%. This indicates that Canadian firms increased the amount of 
dividends paid after the tax law change. A similar comparison for the U.S. 
sample, where there was no tax law change, did not reveal any significant 
difference between the pre and post tax law means.
Morgan (1980) also studied the effect of the differential tax treatment of 
dividends and capital gains after the 1972 Canadian tax law change. He 
concludes that Canadian investors regarded dividend income and capital gains 
as imperfect substitutes before the tax law change (i.e. capital gains were 
preferred to dividend income). After the tax law change, the two were regarded 
as perfect substitutes suggesting that people were indifferent to receiving 
dividend income or realizing capital gains. This again implies that the tax law
11
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change affected dividend behavior of Canadian investors.
Ben-Horim, Hochman and Palmon (1987), Abruntyn and Turner (1990), 
Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990) and Bolster and Janjigian (1991) examine 
the impact of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act on dividend payout ratios. 
Ben-Horim, Hochman and Palmon (1987), in a theoretical paper, predict that 
payout ratios should increase after the tax law reform because of the elimination 
of capital gains tax advantage. Abruntyn and Turner (1990) and Bolster and 
Janjigian (1991) find no significant difference between the pre and post tax law 
dividend payout means. Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990), however, conclude 
that the mean payout ratios increased after the tax law change.
Khoury and Smith (1977), Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990) and 
Ben-Horim, Hochman and Palmon (1987) suggest that changes in tax laws 
affect dividend payout ratios. None of the above studies, however, adjusted for 
macro-economic effects. This study adjusts for macro-economic influences in 
examining the effect of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios.
III. The Effects of Dividend Policies on the Value of a Firm
Irrelevancy and relevancy are the two main theories on the relationship 
between dividend policy and value of a firm.
12
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A. The Irrelevancy Theory
The Irrelevancy theory says that the dividend policy of a corporation, 
given its investment policy, has no effect on its stock prices in a perfect market 
Dividend policy is therefore irrelevant to the value of a firm. The argument 
underlying this theory was given in Chapter One. The two well-known studies 
that provide empirical evidence in support of the irrelevancy theory are Black 
and Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes (1982).
Black and Scholes (1974) test the relationship between the value of a 
firm and its dividend policy by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. They 
argue that a firm that changes its dividend policy attracts as well as drives away 
potential investors based on different individual preferences for dividends. The 
net effect is that the policy change does not affect the firm’s value. They 
conclude that returns on stocks with high dividend yields are not significantly 
different from those with low yields. Miller and Scholes (1982) also find there is 
no significant relationship between dividend yield and expected return. The 
dividend policy of a firm is therefore irrelevant to its value. Huberman (1990) 
relaxed the M & M’s (1961) no transaction cost assumption and still concludes 
that dividends are irrelevant to shareholders’ welfare.
B. The Relevancy Theory
The relevancy theory says that dividend policy affects the value of a firm, 
though there is no consensus as to the nature or source of this valuation effect.
13
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Some argue that dividends have a positive impact on the value of a firm while 
others say that the impact of dividends on the value of a firm is negative.
(1). Positive Effects Argument: Early dividend studies by Graham and Dodd 
(1951), Gordon (1959) and Durand (1959) examine the relationship between 
dividend policy and value of a firm by regressing prices on aggregate dividends 
and retained earnings. The equation used by these studies is given as follows:
p i . t  = a  + b D i v i , t  + c R i , t  +  £ i#f
where Pi t is the price per share for firm i in period t,
Div, t is foe aggregate dividends paid by firm i in period t,
Ri t is retained earnings for firm i in period t and 
elt is foe error term for firm i in period t  
They find significant positive coefficients on foe dividend variable and conclude 
that there is a positive relationship between dividends and foe value of a firm. 
The results also show that foe dividend coefficient is significantly higher than foe 
retained earnings coefficient Friend and Puckett (1964) used normalized 
earnings to run foe regression and find that there is a positive relationship 
between prices and dividends. They, however, note that foe difference between 
foe dividend coefficient and foe earnings coefficient is smaller when normalized 
earnings are used in foe regression.
Long (1978) and Poterba (1986) examine foe price behavior of two 
classes of shares issued by Citizens Utilities Company. The two classes were
14
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identical in ail aspects except for the type of dividend paid. One group paid 
cash dividends taxed at the investor’s personal tax rate while the other paid 
stock dividends taxed at the capital gains rate. Both studies conclude that the 
price of the stock class that paid cash dividends was generally higher though 
Poterba finds that the two classes were priced equally in some periods.
Bailey (1988) also examines the price behavior of Canadian firms that 
issued two classes of stocks. One class pad cash dividends while the other 
realized capital gains. He concludes that equities that paid cash dividends sell 
at a premium in some periods. He, however, notes that there is no evidence 
to show that investors prefer cash income to equal amounts of capital gains.
(2). Information Effects Hypothesis: The information asymmetry hypothesis 
argues that the expectation of higher earnings and not necessarily 
shareholders’ preference for high dividends raises stock prices. Empirical 
testing has established that prices of shares rise when there is an unexpected 
increase in dividends. Studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this 
information effects argument are Pettit (1972), Pettit (1976), Watts (1973), Laub 
(1976), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Woolridge 
(1983), Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), Hess, Eades and Kim (1985), Ofer and 
Siegel (1987), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Elfakhani (1993) and Gweon, Lee 
and Shin (1993).
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) examine the reaction of share
15
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prices upon stock split announcements. They conclude that share prices 
increase when a stock split announcement is accompanied by an 
announcement of an effective increase in dividends. On the other hand, share 
prices decrease when a stock split announcement is accompanied by an 
announcement of an effective decrease in dividends.
Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson 
(1986) examine a sample of firms that either paid their first dividends or initiated 
dividends after a 10-year break. Both studies find significant increases in stock 
prices on the day the initial dividend announcements were made.
Miller and Rock (1985) argue that dividend announcements under 
asymmetric information provide investors with information about the earnings 
ability of a firm. An unexpected increase in dividends is interpreted as 
management’s way of communicating to investors that a firm's earnings are 
higher than expected. This good news drives up share prices and increases 
the firm’s value.
Other theoretical papers that argue that prices of shares should rise 
when there is an unexpected increase in dividends are Watts (1973), Watts 
(1976), Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Ambarish, John and 
Williams (1987), Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Williams (1988).
(3). Aaencv Theory: Agency theory says that an optimum dividend policy 
can be established by a trade-off between floatation costs of raising external
16
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capital and the benefit of reduced agency costs. Firms that pay a lot of 
dividends use external financing more often than those that pay smaller 
amounts of dividends and this results in high floatation costs. These firms, 
however, have low agency costs because they are monitored more often by the 
capital market The advantage of low agency cost and the disadvantage of 
high floatation cost help determine an optimal dividend policy.
Rozeff examines the average dividend payout ratios of 1000 non­
regulated firms in 64 industries between 1974 and 1980. He finds that dividend 
payout is negatively related to the percentage of insiders. The higher the 
percentage of insiders, the less the need to pay dividends to reduce agency 
costs, and vice versa. He also finds that the number of outside stockholders is 
positively related to dividend payout ratios (firms with a large number of outside 
stockholders pay out more dividends to reduce high agency costs). His other 
findings are that high growth firms and very risky firms have low dividend 
payout ratios. Dempsey and Laber (1992) provide evidence consistent with 
Rozeff (1982). They conclude that firms with low dividend payout ratios have 
fewer shareholders and higher systematic risk. Easterbrook (1984) argues that 
dividend payments force firms into the external markets where cost of 
monitoring managers is low. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) conclude that firms 
with higher expected floatation costs pay less dividends.
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(4). Tax Effects Hypothesis: Proponents of the tax effects hypothesis argue 
that a firm’s stock price may be negatively related to dividend yield if the tax 
rate on dividend income is higher than the tax rate on capital gains. This 
hypothesis therefore suggests that the stock price should be positively related 
to the dividend yield if the tax rate on dividend income is less than the tax rate 
on capital gains. If the tax effects hypothesis is correct, there should be a 
positive relationship between expected return and dividend yields for countries 
that have higher effective tax rates on dividend income than on capital gains 
and vice versa.
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1982), Brennan (1970), Stone and Barter (1979), and Rosenberg and Marathe 
(1979) examine the relationship between dividends and security returns using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. They find a positive relationship between 
expected return and dividend yield. Blume (1980) finds a U-shaped relationship 
between dividend yield and expected return. Stocks that pay no dividends and 
those that pay very large dividends provide the highest rate of return. Keim 
(1985) also finds a U-shaped pattern but only for the month of January.
Amoako-Adu, Rashid and Stebbins (1992) study the effect of the 
introduction of a $500,000 capital gains tax exemption on stock prices in 
Canada and the reduction of this exemption to $100,000 two years later by 
examining the price behavior of two groups of low and high dividend yield firms. 
They find that the introduction of the $500,000 tax exemption increased stock
18
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prices of the low dividend yield group (capital gains stock). The subsequent 
reduction in the capital gains tax exempt limit in 1987 resulted in an increase in 
stock prices of the high dividend yield group. This suggests that a security’s 
stock price is affected by its tax liability.
Masulis and Trueman (1988) examine the implications of differential 
personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. They 
conclude that shareholders prefer deferred dividends to dividend income 
because of the tax advantage associated with capital gains. They note, 
however, that unlimited deferral of dividend could be costly to a firm. Firms that 
have excess retained earnings are very likely to invest in projects with 
decreasing marginal rates of return. They argue that the tax advantage and the 
cost disadvantage of capital gains cause shareholders in different tax brackets 
to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies.
Talmor and Titman (1990) suggest that investor’s preference for cash 
dividends or stock repurchases depends on the stability of personal tax rates. 
With constant personal tax rates, stock repurchases have tax advantages over 
dividends because of the possibility of tax deferment With varying personal tax 
rates, it becomes difficult to make any general statements because there are 
some instances when dividends are preferred to capital gains. For example, if 
personal tax rates are expected to increase in the future, shareholders would 
rather receive dividend income and pay current taxes than realize future capital 
gains that may be taxed higher.
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Chaplinsky and Seyhun (1990) suggest that investors try to reduce their 
tax liability by avoiding dividend income that is taxed at a higher rate. Brennan 
and Thakor (1990) conclude that despite the preferential tax treatment given to 
capital gains, if the effective personal tax rate on dividends is low, shareholders 
with low ownership holdings would prefer dividends while those with high 
ownership holdings would prefer repurchases. Chen, Grundy and Stambaugh 
(1990) could not find any evidence of a tax penalty associated with cash 
dividends.
DeAngelo (1991) investigates why firms pay dividends at all, if there are 
tax advantages associated with deferred income. He argues that there is a 
strong relationship between tax deferral and consumption deferral because the 
two are jointly supplied. If all firms in the economy decide to enjoy the tax 
deferral advantage associated with capital gains, consumption deferral will 
occur. This consumption deferral in turn creates a great demand for firms that 
pay dividends because investors want to spread their consumption over time.
IV. Untner’s Partial Adjustment Model
Lintner (1956) examines the variables that affect dividend policies of 
firms. His major conclusions are:
1. Earnings are the most important variable in a firm’s dividend decision.
2. Managers are very reluctant to make dividend policy changes that have 
to be reversed within a short period.
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3. Managers are more concerned with the rate of change in the existing 
dividend payout ratio than with establishing a new dividend payout ratio.
Untner derived a dividend adjustment model for explaining the dividend 
behavior of U.S. firms between 1918 and 1941. Untner’s model was able to 
explain 85% of the changes in dividends in his sample.
Fama and Babiak (1968), Partington (1984), and Edelman, Baker and 
Farreliy (1985), provide evidence in support of Untner’s model. Nakamura and 
Nakamura (1985) and Nakamura (1989) use Untner’s model on a sample of 
Japanese firms. Nakamura and Nakamura (1985) conclude that including a 
lagged earnings variable in the equation improves the explanatory power of the 
model. This result is consistent with Fama and Babiak (1968). Nakamura 
(1989) also concludes that estimating Untner’s model by using a sample of 
firms with both dividend increases and decreases may lead to a specification 
error. He estimates the model differently for firms that increased dividends and 
for those that decreased dividends.
V. Summary of Existing Research
A review of the existing literature indicates that previous research 
concentrated on U.S. firms with little attention given to the dividend policy of 
firms in other countries. There are also contradictory hypotheses on the effect 
of dividend policy on the value of a firm. The irrelevancy theory says that there
21
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is no relationship between the value of a firm and dividend policy. The 
information effects hypothesis suggests that dividends have a positive impact 
on the value of a firm, while the tax effects hypothesis implies that dividends 
have a negative effect on the value of a firm. Previous empirical studies provide 
evidence in support of each hypothesis. These contradictory empirical results 
call for more research in the relationship between dividend policy and the value 
of a firm.
This study examines the relationship between dividends and the value of 
a firm before and after a tax law change in countries that had a significant tax 
law change. The previous studies have been criticized on the grounds that 
information effects may have introduced some bias in the results. This problem 
is minimized in this study because any such biases should apply equally to the 
pre and post tax law periods. Any change in the relationship between the 
dividend policy and the value of a firm after a tax law change can therefore be 
partly attributed to tax effects. This study also employs a variation of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model that avoids the shortcoming of a beta-based model. 
Market value of equity and ratio of book-to-market value of equity are used as 
alternative risk variables.
Lintner’s model has been tested with U.S. data and recently with 
Japanese data. The application of this model to data in other countries adds to 
the literature of dividend policies.
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CHAPTER 3
TAX ENVIRONMENT IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES AND STUDY DESIGN
I. Tax Environment
The main tax systems used in different countries are the classical and 
integrated tax systems. The classical tax system makes no distinction between 
retained and distributed profits. Corporate profits are taxed twice; once at the 
corporate level and again at the personal level. This is known as the "economic 
double taxation" of dividends. The integrated tax system is a system where the 
incidence of economic double taxation is partly reduced or eliminated. A 
system that partially reduces the double taxation is called a partial integration 
system and one that eliminates the double taxation completely is called a full 
integration or full imputation system.
Full integration can be achieved at the corporate or shareholders’ level.
At the corporate level, companies are exempt from paying taxes on distributed 
income but dividends received by investors are taxed. At the shareholders’ 
level, full integration is achieved by allowing shareholders to claim full credit for 
taxes paid by the corporation.
Partial integration can be achieved at the corporate or shareholders’ level
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also. The two systems used to reduce double taxation at the corporate level 
are the split-rate system and the partial dividend reduction system, in the spiit- 
rate system, retained and distributed profits are taxed differently. Usually, the 
distributed profits are taxed at a lower rate to compensate for the extra taxes 
that are paid on dividends. The partial dividend deduction system allows 
companies to deduct some percentage of gross dividends paid in calculating 
taxable profits. For example, firms may be allowed to deduct 20% of the 
amount of cash dividends paid. This allows firms to reduce taxes on distributed 
profits.
Two ways to reduce the double taxation at the shareholders’ level are the 
partial imputation system and the partial shareholder relief system. In the partial 
imputation system, retained and distributed profits are taxed at the same rate 
but shareholders receive partial credit for corporate taxes paid on distributed 
profit The partial shareholder relief system allows domestic shareholders partial 
credit for corporate taxes paid. The tax system in each country and the tax law 
changes are discussed in the next section.
II. Australian Tax System and Tax Law Changes
Australia had the classical tax system in the early 80’s. The maximum 
corporate tax was 46% and the maximum personal tax rate was 60%. The 
personal tax rates were considered high by Australian citizens. These high 
rates coupled with poor economic conditions led to tax avoidance and evasion.
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These events led to the call for tax law changes. The tax reform movement 
started in 1984 and the content of the tax amendment was announced in 
September 1985. A major objective of the tax reform was to reduce individual 
marginal tax rates. The highest personal marginal tax rate was reduced from 
60% to 55% in 1986 and later to 48.3% in 19871. The new tax law also 
introduced a foil imputation system in 1987. This system eliminated the double 
taxation of dividends because shareholders are credited with the full taxes paid 
by firms. The imputation system necessitated the re-classification of dividends. 
Dividends paid from profits already taxed at the corporate level are classified as 
"franked" dividends. These are exempted from any taxes at the shareholder’s 
level. "Unfranked" dividends are paid from company profits that haven’t been 
taxed, and therefore are subject to taxes at the shareholder’s level. The 
Australian imputation system does not provide cash refunds on imputation 
credits. The corporate tax rate was temporarily increased from 46% to 49% to 
partly finance the cost of changing from a classical to an imputation system. 
This rate was later reduced to 39% in 1988. Dividend payments and capital 
gains are taxed at the personal tax rate in Australia
III. French Tax System and Tax Law Changes
France currently has a partial imputation system in which corporate taxes 
are partially refunded to shareholders as tax credits. The partial credit rate is
1The current highest personal tax rate is 49%.
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50%. This is called the "avoir fiscal". If the "avoir fiscal" exceeds the income tax 
liability, the excess is refunded to shareholders. Dividends are taxed as 
ordinary income while capital gains are taxed at a special rate.
France reduced its corporate tax rate from 50% to 45% in 1986 and 
further to 42% in 1987. The highest individual tax rate was also reduced from 
65% to 58% in 1986 and later to 56.8% in 1987. In 1989, France had a major 
tax reform when it introduced the split-rate tax system. Under this system, the 
corporate tax rate on distributed profit was maintained at 42% but the rate on 
retained profits was reduced to 34%. The capital gains tax rate was also 
increased from 15% to 18.1%. The capital gains tax rate is a flat rate that 
applies if a shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares in a company or if 
proceeds from a sale of shares exceed a certain limit per year. This limit is 
FF251.500 (equivalent to $41,508 in 1988) before the tax law change and 
FF307.600 (equivalent to $53,246 in 1989) after the tax law change in 1989.
IV. German Tax System and Tax Law Changes
The German tax system is one of the most stable in the industrialized 
world. Germany introduced the full imputation and split-rate systems in 1976. 
The full imputation system allows shareholders to claim full credit for taxes paid 
at the corporate level. If the tax credit exceeds the income tax, shareholders 
can file for a refund. The tax rate on retained profit was 56% but this was 
reduced to 50% in 1990. The rate on distributed profit remained unchanged at
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36%. The 1990 tax law change also reduced the highest personal tax rate from 
56% to 53%. Dividend income in Germany is taxed as ordinary income while 
capital gains are tax exempt except for gains from sale of land owned for less 
than two years and these are taxed at the normal income tax rate.
V. Japanese Tax System and Tax Law Changes
Japan had a split-rate system before they changed to a partial 
shareholder relief system in 1990. In the Japanese split-rate system, the 
corporate tax rate on distributed profit was 32%, while the rate on retained 
earnings was 42%. The highest personal tax rate was 57%. The partial 
shareholder relief system allows domestic shareholders to deduct 5% of their 
dividend income from their personal tax liability at the federal level. The 
corporate tax rate was reduced to 37.5% after the 1990 tax law change and the 
highest personal tax rate was reduced to 35%. The tax law change introduced 
a 20% flat capital gains rate.
VI. United States Tax System and Tax Law Changes
United States has the classical tax system. Companies pay taxes on 
earnings and shareholders pay personal taxes on dividend income. The 1986 
Tax Reform Act was a major tax law change in the U.S. and became effective in 
January 1987. The mayor objectives of the Reform Act were the reduction of 
rates and the elimination of the tax advantage accorded capital gains. The
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corporate rate was reduced from 46% to 34%2 and the top individual rate was 
reduced from 50% to 31%3. Before the tax law change, the highest capital 
gains rate was 20% while the highest tax rate on dividend income was 50%.
The tax law change eliminated the preferential treatment given to capital gains. 
Both capital gains and dividend income are now taxed as ordinary income. The 
summaries of the tax systems and the tax rates in the five countries are 
provided in Tables 1 and 2.
2Starting from 1987, an additional 5% is levied on income between $100,000 and 
• $335,000.
^The highest personal tax rate immediately after the tax law change in 1987 was 
38.5% and this was later reduced to 31% in 1988. The 31% top tax bracket includes 
an additional 5% levied on income over $49,300 for single people and $82,150 for 
married couples.
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Table 1: Tax Systems in Effect in the Countries Under Study (1983-1991)
Country Before the Tax Law 
Change
After the Tax Law 
Change
Date of 
Change
Australia Classical system Full imputation 
system
1987
France One corporate rate 
and partial imputation 
system
Split-rate and partial 
imputation system
1989
Germany Split-rate and full 
imputation system
Split-rate and full 
imputation system with 
rate reductions
1990
Japan Split-rate system Partial shareholder 
relief system
1990
U.S. Classical tax system Classical tax 
system with 1986 
Reform Act
1987
Source: Taxing Profits in a Global Economy Domestic and International
Issues. OECD Publication, 1991.
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Table 2: Summary of the Tax Rates in the Five Countries (1983-1991)
Panel A: Highest Corporate Tax Rates in the Five Countries
Country Before the Tax Effective Date After the Tax
Law Change of Change Law Change
Australia 46.0% 1987 49.0%*
France 50.0% 1989 42(D) 34(R)%
Germany 36(D) 56(R)% 1990 36(D) 50(R)%
Japan 32(D) 42(R)% 1990 37.5%
U.S. 46.0% 1987 34.0%
D is distributed profit
R is retained profit
Panel B: Highest Marginal Personal Tax Rates on Dividend
Income in the Five Countries
Country Before the Tax Effective Date After the Tax
Law Change of Change Law Change
Australia 60.0% 1987 48.3%*
France 57.9% 1989 57.9%
Germany 56.0% 1990 53.0%
Japan 57.0% 1990 35.0%
U.S. 50.0% 1987 31.0%
Panel C: Maximum Capital Gains Tax Rates in the Five Countries
Country Before the Tax 
Law Change
Effective Date 
of Change
After the Tax 
Law Change
Australia 60.0% 1987 48.3%
France 15.0% 1989 18.1%
Germany - 1990 -
Japan - 1990 20.0%
U.S. 20.0% 1987 31.0%
*The 1991 highest corporate and marginal personal tax rates are 39% and 49% respectively.
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VII. Calculation of Effective Tax Rates
As stated earlier, the five countries changed their tax laws within the 
period of study. The total effective rates on dividend income and capital gains 
are calculated before and after a major tax law change in each country. The 
tax law changes in Australia, France and Japan are considered major because 
these countries changed their tax systems. Though Germany only had a 
reduction of rates, this is also considered major because the German tax 
system has been very stable over the years. The 1986 Tax Reform Act in U.S. 
is a major tax law change because it eliminated the tax advantage accorded to 
capital gains over dividend income.
It is not possible to determine if there is a tax preference for dividend 
income or capital gains in each country by simply looking at the corporate and 
personal tax rates since different countries have different tax features (see 
Tables 1 and 2). The tax rates in conjunction with the different tax systems are 
used to calculate the total effective tax rates under three scenarios:
Scenario 1: All corporate earnings are paid as dividends.
Scenario 2: No dividends are paid but capital gains are realized.
Scenario 3: No dividends are paid and capital gains are not realized.
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The major assumptions initially used in calculating the total effective rates are as 
follows:
1. Tax payers are in the top marginal tax bracket4.
2. Tax payers are in the top capital gains tax bracket4.
3. Tax payers face federal government tax only.
The formulas used in obtaining the effective tax rates for each country are given
in Table 3.
''These assumptions are later relaxed.
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Table 3: Formulas Used for the Calculation of Effective Tax Rates
Scenario 1 2 3
Australia
Before T + (1-T)M T + (1-T)g T
After T + [(1-T) + T]M - T = M* T T
France
Before T + [(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T) T + (1-T)g T
After T + [(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T) T* + (l-T^g T*
Germany
Before T + [(1-T) + TIM - T T* T*
After T + [(1-T) + TjM - T T* T*
Japan
Before T + (1-T)M - c(1-T) T" 1"
After T + (1-T)M - c(1-T) T + (1-T)g T
U.S.
Before T + (1-T)M T + (1-T)g T
After T + (1-T)M T + (1-T)g T
where T is the corporate tax rate,
T* is the corporate tax rate on retained profits for countries using the 
split-rate system,
M is the personal tax rate on dividends, 
g is the capital gains tax rate and 
c is the partial credit rate.
Scenario 1: All corporate earnings are paid as dividends.
Scenario 2: No dividends are paid but capital gains are realized.
Scenario 3: No dividends are paid and capital gains are not realized.
* Total tax liability in Australia is M (if M > T) and T (if M < T), but the 
highest marginal tax rate is 48.3% which is less than T. This means that effectively 
the total tax liability is T.
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The effective tax rates are calculated for the pre and post tax law 
periods. A summary of the effective tax rates is given in Table 4 and the details 
of the calculations are given in Appendix A. These rates show that before the 
tax law changes, investors in the highest tax bracket in France, Japan and U.S. 
were clearly better off with realized and unrealized capital gains than with 
dividend income. In Australia, the unrealized capital gains option maximized 
shareholders’ wealth. However, the effective rates on dividend income and 
realized capital gains options were the same which suggests that investors 
should be indifferent to the dividend income and realized capital gains options.
In Germany, the investors were indifferent to all three options.
After the tax law changes, investors in the highest tax bracket in France 
and Japan were still better off with realized and unrealized capital gains than 
with dividend income. Investors in Germany were slightly better off with capital 
gains (realized and unrealized) while investors in Australia were indifferent to the 
three options. In U.S., the investors were indifferent to dividend income and 
realized capital gains but the unrealized capital gains option still maximized 
shareholders’ wealth.
The results of these calculations suggest that shareholders’ wealth may 
be affected positively or adversely depending on the nature of the tax law 
change. If the tax effects hypothesis is correct, then there should be a positive 
relationship between dividend yield and the value of a firm in countries that have 
higher effective rates on dividends. This relationship is therefore examined
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before and after the tax law changes to see if there are any changes due to the 
tax law changes.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 4: Summary of Effective Tax Rates for Investors in the
Highest Tax Bracket
Panel A: Effective Tax Rates Before the Tax Law Change
Country Dividends
Paid
Cap. Gains 
Realized
Cap. Gains 
Unrealized
Australia 78.40% 78.40% 46.00%
France 68.43% 57.50%* 50.00%
Germany 56.00% 56.00% 56.00%
Japan 67.36% 42.00% 42.00%
U.S. 73.00% 56.80% 46.00%
Panel B: Effective Tax Rates After the Tax Law Change
Country Dividends
Paid
Cap. Gains 
Realized
Cap. Gains 
Unrealized
Australia 49.00% 49.00% 49.00%
France 63.37% 45.95%* 34.00%
Germany 53.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Japan 56.25% 50.00% 37.50%
U.S. 54.46% 54.46% 34.00%
5lt is assumed that investors pay the capital gains tax.
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The preceding calculations were based on the assumption that investors 
were in the highest personal and capital gains tax bracket This assumption 
was relaxed and the effective tax rates for investors in other personal tax 
brackets were calculated. These rates are shown in Table 5.
The shareholders’ wealth in all tax brackets in Australia, Japan and U.S. 
were maximized with the unrealized capital gains option before the tax law 
change. After the tax law change, Japanese and U.S. shareholders in all tax 
brackets were still better off with unrealized capital gains while shareholders in 
all tax brackets in Australia were indifferent to all options.
In France, shareholders in three tax brackets were better off with 
dividend income than with unrealized capital gains before the tax law change. 
After the tax law change, shareholders in only two tax brackets were still better 
off with dividend income. This means that shareholders in one tax bracket who 
used to be better off with dividend income became better off with unrealized 
capital gains after the tax law change.
Shareholders in five of the six tax brackets were better off with dividend 
income than with unrealized capital gains in Germany before the tax law 
change. After the tax law change, investors in only three of the five tax 
brackets were still better off with dividend income. This suggests that the tax 
law change provided incentives for investors in two tax brackets to opt for 
capital gains rather than dividend income.
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Table 5: Effective Tax Rates for Other Tax Brackets
Before the Tax Law Change
------------------------------ ,----------- -------------------------------------
Australia
Personal 
Tax Rate
Dividend
Income
Realized 
Cap. Gains
Unrealized 
Cap. Gains
20.0% 56.80% 56.80%* 46.0%
38.0% 66.52% 65.52% 46.0%
46.0% 70.84% 70.84% 46.0%
48.3% 72.08% 72.08% 46.0%
60.0% 78.40% 78.40% 46.0%
France
5.0% 28.75% 57.50%**® 50.0%
24.0% 43.00% 57.50% 50.0%
29.0% 46.75% 57.50% 50.0%
49.0% 61.75% 57.50% 50.0%
57.9% 68.43% 57.50% 50.0%
Germany
19.2% 19.2% 56.0% 56.0%
29.6% 29.6% 56.0% 56.0%
36.9% 36.9% 56.0% 56.0%
51.5% 51.5% 56.0% 56.0%
53.0% 53.0% 56.0% 56.0%
56.0% 56.0% 56.0% 56.0%
Jn  Australia, capital gains are taxed at the same rate as dividend income, therefore m = g. 
"The 15% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if proceeds from the sale of 
shares exceed FF251,500 (equivalent to $41,508 in 1988) per year or if the shareholder holds 
more than 25% of the shares in a company.
6See footnote 5.
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Table 5 Continued
Japan. (
Personal 
Tax Rate
Dividend
Income
Realized
Cap.
Gains
Unrealized 
Cap. Gains
20.0% 42.20% 42.0% 42.0%
30.5% 49.24% 42.0% 42.0%
35.0% 52.40% 42.0% 42.0%
57.0% 67.36% 42.0% 42.0%
U.S.
15.0% 54.10% 54.10% 46.0%
28.0% 61.12% 56.80%*” 46.0%
31.0% 62.74% 56.80% 46.0%
50.0% 73.00% 56.80% 46.0%
” *The highest capital gains tax rate in U.S. was 20%.
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Table 5 Continued
Panel B: Effective Tax Rates for Other Tax Brackets
After the Tax Law Change
AUSTRALIA
Personal 
Tax Rate
Dividend
Income
Realized 
Cap. Gains
Unrealized 
Cap. Gains
20.0% 49.0% 49.0% 49.0%
38.0% 49.0% 49.0% 49.0%
46.0% 49.0% 49.0% 49.0%
48.3% 49.0% 49.0% 49.0%
France
5.0% 17.35% 45.95%*7 34.0%
24.0% 33.88% 45.95% 34.0%
29.0% 38.23% 45.95% 34.0%
49.0% 55.63% 45.95% 34.0%
57.9% 63.37% 45.95% 34.0%
Germany
19.2% 19.2% 50.0% 50.0%
29.6% 29.6% 50.0% 50.0%
36.9% 36.9% 50.0% 50.0%
51.5% 51.5% 50.0% 50.0%
53.0% 53.0% 50.0% 50.0%
‘The 18.1% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if proceeds from the sale of 
shares exceed FF307.600 (equivalent to $53,246 in 1989) per year or if the shareholder holds 
more than 25% of the shares In a company.
7See footnote 5.
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Table 5 Continued
Japan. |
Personal 
Tax Rate
Dividend
Income
Realized
Cap.
Gains
Unrealized I 
Cap. Gains
20.0% 46.88% 50.0%** 37.5%
30.5% 53.44% 50.0% 37.5%
35.0% 56.25% 50.0% 37.5%
U.S.
15.0% 43.90% 43.90%*“ 34.0%
28.0% 52.48% 52.48% 34.0%
31.0% 54.46% 54.46% 34.0%
**The 20% capital gains tax rate in Japan is a flat rate.
***ln the U.S., capital gains are taxed at the same rate as dividend income, 
therefore m = g.
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vni. study Pesign
The main source of data for this study is the Disclosure-World Scope 
data base. This data base provides annual financial information on public firms 
all over the world. The use of one data source for all countries minimizes data 
inconsistencies and different standards that are often encountered with different 
data sources. Information on corporate and personal tax rates and the tax 
systems in each country are obtained from Price Waterhouse Tax Handbook 
International Tax Summaries, and Organization for Economic-Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) publications. These sources provide details of different 
tax issues in many countries. The risk free rates are obtained from International 
Financial Statistics.
The criteria used for firm selection are as follows:
1. All firms must be industrial companies
2. The firms must have complete data for all the relevant variables for the 
period of study and
3. The fiscal year dates for all the companies must not be more than three 
months apart
The use of only industrial firms is an effort to keep the data more 
homogeneous because U.S. dividend studies have shown that dividend payout 
ratios for utilities are very high compared to those of other industries. Harkins 
and Walsh Jr. (1971) report that the average payout ratios for utility companies 
range from 47% to 82%. Michel (1979) also finds that dividend payout ratios for
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electric firms range from 65% to 73%. The selection of firms with complete data 
for the relevant variables for the entire period means that only “successful" firms 
are used. This criterion introduces a selection bias but this is necessary to 
ensure continuity. Most of the firms used have the same end of year fiscal 
dates with only a few that are three months or less apart
The period of study is between 1983 and 1991, a nine year period. This 
period is chosen because complete financial data for international dividends is 
not readily available for longer periods. The distribution of firms that meet all 
the criteria is given below.
COUNTRY NO. OF FIRMS
Australia 37
France 107
Germany 80
Japan 252
U.S. 372
Disdosure-Worldscope data is stored in CD-ROM. The data for all firms 
listed in each country are first down-loaded to a floppy disk. The data are later 
transferred to a Quattro Pro program where all the firms are sorted according to 
industry group and screened. The data analysis is done with SAS programs.
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CHAPTER 4
COUNTRY COMPARATIVE DIVIDEND STUDIES
I. Introduction
Two studies that compare dividend policies of different countries are 
Khoury and Smith (1977) and Michel and Shaked (1986). Khoury and Smith 
compare the dividend payout ratios and dividend yields for Canadian and U.S 
firms. They conclude that U.S. dividend payout ratios and dividend yields are 
significantly higher than those of the Canadians. Michel and Shaked find that 
dividend yields for U.S. firms are significantly higher than dividend yields of 
Japanese firms, while dividend payout ratios of Japanese firms are higher than 
those of U.S. firms. These results suggest that there are differences in dividend 
payout ratios across countries. In this study, dividend payout ratios, dividend 
yields and dividend growth rates in Australia, France, Germany, Japan and U.S. 
are compared for any significant differences.
II. Methodology
The nine-year means and the yearly means of dividend payout ratios, 
dividend yields and dividend growth rates are calculated for each country.
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These means are compared by conducting a Tukey "means difference" test 
This test is used because it is more suitable for multiple comparisons. The 
Tukey-Kramer method considers two means to be significantly different if
S[(i/Jrri/t)/3i^ >'?(‘;*-v)..............3
where y, and y, are means of group i and j respectively,
s is the mean square error for the one way Anova model,
n, is the number of observations in group i and
q(a;k,v) is the a-ievel critical value of standardized range distribution of k
independent normal variables with v degrees of freedom.
A 5% significance level is used to see if there are any significant differences 
between the countries.
III. Results
The results of the inter-country comparison show that there are 
significant differences across countries. Table 6 shows the means and 
standard deviations of dividend payout ratios, dividend yields and dividend 
growth rates for the nine-year period.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Dividend Payout Ratios, Dividend
Yields and Dividend Growth Rates for the Period 1983 -1991
Country
Dividend Payout 
Ratios
Dividend Yield Dividend Growth
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Australia 0.5273 0.1755 A 0.0477 0.0169 A 0.1306 0.1116 A
France 0.2563 0.1577 C 0.0214 0.0119 B 0.1089 0.1146 AB
Germany 0.5112 0.2056 A 0.0231 0.0098 B 0.0721 0.1065 CB
Japan 0.3348 0.1544 B 0.0099 0.0037 C 0.0518 0.0585 C
U.S. 0.3148 0.2102 B 0.0229 0.0160 B 0.0572 0.1077 C
Means that have the same letter are not significantly different
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For the entire period, Australia has the highest average dividend payout 
ratio of 52.73%, followed by Germany, Japan and U.S. with average dividend 
payout ratios of 51.12%, 33.48% and 31.48% respectively. France has the 
lowest dividend payout of 25.63%. The Tukey "means difference" test indicates 
that dividend payout means for Australian and German firms are not significantly 
different However, these two means are significantly different from the payout 
means of France, Japan and U.S. The dividend payout ratios of Japan and U.S 
are not significantly different from each other but are significantly higher than 
that of France.
The dividend yield means for Australia, Germany, U.S., France, and 
Japan are 4.77%, 2.31%, 2.29%, 2.14% and 0.99% respectively. The dividend 
yields for the Australian firms are significantly higher those of the other 
countries. The dividend yields for the German, U.S. and French firms are not 
significantly different from each other. The dividend yields for the Japanese 
firms are significantly lower than those of the other four countries.
Australia also has the highest dividend growth rate of 13.06%. France is 
next with a growth rate of 10.89%, followed by Germany with 7.21%. United 
States dividend growth rate is 5.72% and Japan has the lowest growth rate of 
5.18%. The Australian and French dividend growth rates are not significantly 
different, but are significantly different from those of the other countries. The 
average dividend growth rates for Germany, Japan and U.S. are not significantly 
different
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For the entire period, the results show that the Japanese market exhibits 
the lowest degree of variability in the three statistics. The U.S. market exhibits 
the highest variability in dividend payouts. The Australian market exhibits the 
highest variability in dividend yield, while the French market exhibits the highest 
variability in dividend growth rate.
The yearly means and standard deviations of the three variables are 
shown in Table 7. An examination of the yearly means of dividend payout 
ratios and dividend yields in each country shows that they are fairly stable while 
the growth rates tend to be more volatile.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for the Five Countries
Panel A: The Yearly Means of Dividend Payout Ratios (1983-1991)
| Year | Stats. Australia France Germany Japan U.S.
I 1983 I Mean
R Std.Dev.
0.4844
0.3080
0.3037
0.2729
0.5281
0.3375
0.3491
0.2610
0.3111
0.2636
1984 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.4979
0.2724
0.2616
0.2647
0.5225
0.3050
0.3404
0.2456
0.3083
0.2693
1985 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.4820
0.2317
0.2622
0.2582
0.5323
0.3021
0.3433
0.2492
0.3127
0.2803
1986 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.4780
0.2627
0.2775
0.2622
0.5212
0.3031
0.3584
0.2479
0.3211
0.2983
1987 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.5713
0.2440
0.2573
0.2227
0.5270
0.3000
0.3434
0.2567
0.3030
0.2714
1988 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.5315
0.2545
0.2616
0.2232
0.5136
0.2741
0.3382
0.2207
0.2948
0.2670
1989 I Mean
Std.Dev.
0.5571
0.2410
0.2070
0.1587
0.4544
0.2807
0.3031
0.1834
0.3013
0.2758
1990 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.6381
0.2300
0.2401
0.1876
0.4930
0.2708
0.3224
0.2223
0.3351
0.3037
1991 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.5051
0.3613
0.2361
0.1805
0.5085
0.2827
0.3153
0.2157
0.3458
0.3469
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Table 7 Continued
Panel B: The Yearly Means of Dividend Yields (1983-1991)
Year Stats. Australia France Germany Japan U.S.
1983
Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0531
0.0285
0.0250
0.0225
0.0243
0.0145
0.0148
0.0800
0.0245
0.0186
1984 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0463
0.0238
0.0204
0.0174
0.0266
0.0150
0.0128
0.0078
0.0269
0.0201
1985 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0394
0.0222
0.0234
0.0116
0.0223
0.0119
0.0125
0.0074
0.0231
0.0175
1986 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0478
0.0248
0.0222
0.0173
0.0279
0.0127
0.0103
0.0059
0.0217
0.0166
1987 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0434
0.0138
0.0184
0.0132
0.0207
0.0152
0.0133
0.0044
0.0209
0.0175
1988 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0448
0.0171
0.0213
0.0138
0.0238
0.0123
0.0060
0.0030
0.0213
0.0174
1989 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0600
0.0292
0.0167
0.0109
0.0188
0.0115
0.0054
0.0022
0.0206
0.0169
1990 Mean 
| Std.Dev.
0.0623
0.0399
0.0232
0.0166
0.0226
0.0153
0.0061
0.0025
0.0268
0.0248
1991 I  Mean 
| Std.Dev.
0.0322
0.0238
0.0220
0.0185
0.0211
0.0139
0.0072
0.0030
0.0206
0.0181
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Table 7 Continued:
Panel C: The Yearly Means of Dividend Growth Rates (1983-1991)
Year Stats. Australia France Germany Japan U.S.
1983 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.1359
0.3451
0.0465
0.3166
0.0999
0.3486
0.0435
0.2451
0.0532
0.3173
1984 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0649
0.3234
0.0330
0.2743
0.0985
0.3505
0.0419
0.2257
0.0915
0.2607
1985 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.1606
0.3366
0.1383
0.3621
0.0943
0.4427
0.0640
0.1862
0.0598
0.2377
1986 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0930
0.3204
0.1735
0.4279
0.0344
0.2919
0.0210
0.2712
0.0231
0.2785
1987 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.3300
0.3246
0.1985
0.3018
0.0278
0.2982
-0.0196
0.3162
0.0511
0.2490
1988 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.1709
0.4518
0.1905
0.2884
0.0781
0.3327
0.0511
0.3061
0.0593
0.2174
1989 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.3682
0.4498
0.1602
0.3672
0.0682
0.2915
0.1538
0.2793
0.0700
0.2222
1990 Mean
Std.Dev.
0.0196
0.4370
0.0758
0.3027
0.0840
0.3349
0.0711
0.1512
0.0476
0.2342
1991 Mean
Std.Dev.
-0.1677
0.4707
-0.0395
0.3915
0.0636
0.4092
0.0392
0.1779
0.0590
0.2244
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IV. Discussion
The differences in dividend payout ratios in the countries may be a 
reflection of different institutional structures, economic or tax factors. Germany 
and Japan are often reported as having ownership structures that are 
concentrated in the hands of a few establishments, mostly banks, if ownership 
structure affects the amount of dividends paid, one would expect that Germany 
and Japan should have similar dividend payout ratios. The results in this 
section are not consistent with this point of view. Germany has a high dividend 
payout ratio while Japan has a relatively low dividend payout ratio. France has 
the lowest dividend payout ratio followed by Japan. The Japanese low dividend 
payout ratio has been attributed to the emphasis on long term growth by firms. 
The low dividend yields observed for the Japanese and U.S. firms are 
consistent with Michel and Shaked (1986). The low growth rates observed in 
Japan and U.S may be a reflection of the fact that firms in these countries are 
slow in adjusting their dividend payments to changes in earnings.
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Chapter 5
EFFECTS OF TAX LAW CHANGES ON DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS
I. Introduction
Taxation is an important factor in most financing and investment 
decisions. Most recent tax law changes have reduced both corporate and 
personal tax rates. These reductions result in more cash flow to firms but do 
not necessarily translate to payment of more dividends. The pre and post tax 
law payout ratios in the five countries under study are examined to assess the 
impact of the tax law changes on dividend payout ratios.
II. Hypotheses
The effective tax rates of investors in all tax brackets and the relative 
changes in effective tax rates on dividend income and capital gains are used to 
formulate the theoretical effects of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios. 
These relative changes in effective tax rates are shown in Tables 8 and 9 and 
the effective tax rates for all tax brackets were given in Table 5 (Chapter 3).
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Table 8: Summary of Changes In Effective Tax Rates for Individuals in
the Highest Tax Brackets
Panel A: The Percentage Change in Effective Tax Rates 
for Dividend Payments
Country Before the tax 
Law Change
After the Tax 
Law Change
Percentage
Change
Australia 78.40% 49.00% -37.50%
France 68.43% 63.37% -7.39%
Germany 56.00% 53.00% -5.36%
Japan 67.36% 56.25% -16.50%
U.S. 73.00% 54.46% -25.40%
Panel B: The Percentage Change in Effective Tax Rates 
for Unrealized Capital Gains
Country Before the Tax 
Law Change
After the Tax 
Law Change
Percentage
Change
Australia 46.00% 49.00% 6.12%
France 50.00% 34.00% -32.00%
Germany 56.00% 50.00% -10.71%
Japan 42.00% 37.50% -10.71%
U.S. 46.00% 34.00% -26.09%
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Table 9: Summary of Changes in Effective Tax Rates for
Individuals in Ail the Tax Brackets
Tax Bracket Percentage in Dividend 
Income Rates
Percentage Change in Unrealized 
Capital Gains Rates
Australia
20.0% -13.73% 6.52%
38.0% -26.34% 6.52%
46.0% -30.83% 6.52%
48.3% -32.02% 6.52%
60.0% -37.50% 6.52%
France
5% -39.65% -32.0%
24% -21.21% •32.0%
29% -18.22% -32.0%
49% -9.91% -32.0%
57.9% -7.39% -32.0%
Germany
19.2% 0% -10.71%
29.6% 0% -10.71%
36.9% 0% -10.71%
51.5% 0% -10.71%
53.0% 0% -10.71%
56.0% -5.36% -10.71%
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Table 9 Continued
Tax Bracket Percentage in Dividend 
Income
Percentage Change in Unrealized 
Capital Gains Rates
Japan
20% 11.09% -10.71%
30.5% 8.53% -10.71%
35.0% 7.97% -10.71%
57.0% -16.0% -10.71%
U.S.
28% -18.85% -26.09%
28% -14.14% -26.09%
31% -13.20% -26.09%
50% -25.40% -26.09%
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A. Australia
In Australia, the calculation of effective tax rates tor investors shown in 
Table 5 indicates that investors in all tax brackets were better off with unrealized 
capital gains before the tax law change. After the tax law change, all investors 
became indifferent to dividend income and unrealized capital gains. This means 
that the tax law change eliminated the tax advantage that the unrealized capital 
gains option had over the dividend income option. The tax law change 
therefore favored the dividend income option.
The decline in effective tax rates for dividend income and unrealized 
capital gains are calculated for all tax brackets and is shown in Table 9. The 
result shows that the decline in effective tax rates on dividend income is higher 
than that on unrealized capital gains for investors in all tax brackets. For 
example, the total effective tax rate on dividend income for individuals in the top 
tax bracket before the tax law change was 78.4%. This declined to 49% after 
the tax law change which represents a 37.5% decrease in the effective tax rate. 
The effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains for individuals in the top tax 
bracket increased from 46% to 49% after the tax law change, a 6.12% increase 
in rates. This is another indication that the tax law change favored the payment 
of more dividends8. The dividend payout ratio in Australia is therefore
8lf taxes exclusively influence dividend policy the calculations show that no 
dividends should be paid in Australia, France, Japan and U.S. because it is optimal to 
always realize capital gains. However, we know that firms do pay dividends. 
Therefore the effects of these tax law changes on payout ratios are examined in light 
of whether the tax law changes favor the payment of more or less dividends.
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expected to increase after the tax law change.
However, there were reports of tax evasion in Australia before the tax law
change and this was one of the reasons the government embarked on the 1985
tax reform. Partington (1987) also reports that:
In Australia, approximately 70% of dividends have been received tax free 
in the hands of the initial recipients, and it is therefore possible that 
managers might perceive a tax induced preference for higher payouts 
rather than lower payouts.
This suggests that there were loopholes in the Australian tax system that
enabled investors to shield their dividend income from taxation. This implies
that the high effective tax rates on dividend income before the tax law change
may not be meaningful. A correct hypothesis might therefore accommodate the
assumption that investors did not pay taxes on dividend income and capital
gains. A recalculation of the effective tax rates before the tax law change
shows that investors were indifferent to dividend income or capital gains9. With
this assumption, the expected increase in dividend payout ratios may not
materialize. The pre and post tax law dividend payout ratios should not be
significantly different There have been no reports of tax evasions after the tax
law change.
9lf income taxes on dividends are not paid, the total effective tax rate on dividend 
income will be T, which is the tax paid at the corporate level.
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B. France
In France, the effective tax rates show that investors in the 5%, 24% and 
29% tax brackets preferred dividend income before the tax law change. After 
the tax law change, only investors in the 5% and 24% tax brackets were still 
better off with dividend income10. H ie tax law change therefore provided 
enough incentive for investors in the 29% bracket to change their preference 
from dividend income to unrealized capital gains. This implies that the tax law 
change favored capital gains.
A comparison of the changes in effective tax rates on dividend income 
and unrealized capital gains (Table 9) also shows that the decline in the 
effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains is higher than that on dividend 
income for investors in all tax brackets except for the lowest For example, the 
effective tax rate on dividend income for individuals in the top tax bracket 
declined from 68.43% to 63.37% after the tax law change, a 7.39% decrease. 
The unrealized capital gains tax rate for individuals in the top tax bracket 
declined from 50% to 34%, a relative change of 32%. These relative changes in 
effective tax rates support the conclusion that the tax law change favored capital 
gains. The dividend payout ratios in France are therefore expected to decrease 
after the tax law change.
10We are assuming that number of investors in the various tax brackets are roughly 
the same before and after the tax law change.
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C. Germany
In Germany, the effective tax rates show that investors in the five tax 
brackets were better off with dividend income before the tax law change. After 
the tax law change, investors in only three tax brackets were still better off with 
dividend income. Investors in the remaining two tax brackets preferred capital 
gains. This suggests that the tax law change in Germany favored capital gains.
In addition, the effective tax rates on unrealized capital gains declined for 
all investors but the rates on dividend income remained the same for most 
investors as shown in Table 9. It is only in the top tax bracket that the effective 
tax rate on dividend income declined by 5.36% for some investors compared to 
the 10.71% decline on unrealized capital gains option. This suggests that the 
tax law change favored capital gains and is consistent with the earlier 
conclusion. A decline in dividend payout ratios is therefore expected in 
Germany after the tax law change.
D. Japan
In Japan, the effective tax rates of investors show that investors in all tax 
brackets were better off with unrealized capital gains before and after the tax 
law change. It is not possible to predict the direction of change in dividend 
payout ratios from this information alone.
The calculation of the changes in effective tax rates shows that the 
effective tax rates on unrealized capital gains declined for all investors. On the
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other hand, the effective tax rates on dividend income increased for investors in 
three tax brackets while it decreased for some investors in the top tax bracket 
It appears therefore that the tax law change in Japan generally favored the 
capital gains option. Dividend payout ratios in Japan are therefore expected to 
decrease after the tax law change.
E. United States
Investors in all tax brackets in U.S. preferred unrealized capital gains to 
dividend income before and after the tax law change. As in the case of Japan, 
it is not possible to predict the direction of change in dividend payout ratios 
from this information alone.
The changes in effective tax rates for dividend income and unrealized 
capital gains show that the decline in effective tax rates for unrealized capital 
gains are slightly higher than that on dividend income for most investors except 
in the top tax bracket where the decline in both options are similar. This 
suggests that the tax law change in general favored the unrealized capital gains 
option. The dividend payout ratios in U.S. is therefore expected to decrease 
after the tax law change.
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III. Methodology
The effect of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios is evaluated by 
comparing the pre and post law means. The pared t-test, the Sign test (S-test) 
and the Wilcoxon signed rank test (W-test) are used to test for any significant 
difference between the pre and post-tax law payout ratios.
The paired t-test compares the pre and post tax law means using the 
assumption that the ratios are normally distributed. The W-test and the S-test 
are nonparametric alternatives to the t-test which are less sensitive to the 
normality assumption. In particular, these tests can be more powerful than the 
t-test if outliers are present in the data Such outliers seem to be present in the 
Australian and French data The paired t-test tests the null hypothesis that the 
difference between the "pre" and "post" test means is significantly different from 
zero. The S-test tests the hypothesis that the frequencies of dividend increases 
and decreases before and after the tax law change in each country are similar. 
The W-test tests the hypothesis that the distributions of the pre and post tax law 
payout ratios are identical. If the normality assumption is reasonably valid, 
results of the three tests should not be dramatically different A one-tailed test 
is used for all the countries because the dividend payout ratios are predicted to 
move in a certain direction after the tax law change.
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IV. Results
Tests of the difference between the pre and post tax law dividend payout 
ratios along with their p-values are reported in Table 9. The p-values show the 
significance level of the test. The pre and post law dividend payout ratios in 
Australia are 48.56% and 56.06% respectively. The paired t-test indicates that 
this increase in payout ratio is marginally significant at the 11% level. The W- 
test and S-test show that there is no significant difference between the pre and 
post law payout ratios.
The pre-law dividend payout ratio for France is 27.06% and the post-law 
ratio is 22.77%. The paired t-test indicates that there is a significant decline in 
dividend payout ratios after the tax law change. The S-test and the W-test 
show that there is no significant difference between these two means.
The pre-law mean for Germany is 51.42% and the post-law mean is 
50.08% while the pre and post law means for U.S. are 31.33% and 31.60% 
respectively. Each of the three tests indicate there are no significant differences 
in payout ratios after the tax law changes in these two countries..
The Japanese pre and post law payout ratios are 33.94% and 31.89% 
respectively. All three tests show that the two means are significantly different
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Table 10: The Pre and Post Tax Law Means of Dividend Payout Ratios
Country Pre-Tax Law 
Change Means
Post-Tax Law 
Change Means
Paired*
T-Test
S-Test* W-Test*
Australia 0.4856 0.5606 0.11 0.74 0.28
France 0.2706 0.2277 0.03** 0.35 0.25
Germany 0.5142 0.5008 0.63 0.73 0.68
Japan 0.3394 0.3189 0.04** 0.00** 0.00**
U.S.
. . . .
0.3133 0.3160 0.39 0.14 0.15
*The numbers reported are the p-values. 
**Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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V. Interpretation of the Results
Two predictions are made on the effect of the Australian tax law change 
on dividend payout ratios. One prediction is that dividend payout ratio should 
increase after the tax law change. The other is that both means should not be 
significantly different The later prediction is based on the fact that there was 
widespread evasion of taxes before the tax law change.
The result of the paired t-test shows that the increase in the dividend 
payout ratios is marginally significant at the 11% level. However, the results of 
the W-test and the S-test show that there is no significant difference between 
the two means. An examination of the data shows that the marginal 
significance found by the paired t-test is driven by one outlier, if the data for 
that firm is removed, the three "mean difference" tests will find an insignificant 
difference between the pre and post law ratios. It may therefore be more 
appropriate to conclude that there is no significant difference between the pre 
and post law payout ratios. The Australian firms maintained about the same 
average payout ratios before and after the tax law change. The high effective 
rate on dividend income before the tax law change was irrelevant because 
investors avoided the taxes on dividends.
In France, the result of the paired t-test suggests that the dividend 
payout ratios decreased after the tax law change. The tax law change appears 
to have led to the retention of more corporate earnings by French firms. This 
was expected because one of the reasons given by the French government for
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introducing the spilt-rate system was to boost investment by encouraging 
retention of corporate earnings.
However, the S-test and the W-test show that there is no significant 
difference between the pre and post law payout ratios. This contradicts the 
result of the paired t-test An examination of the distribution of the dividend 
payout ratios shows that there is a skewness in the data The distribution is 
skewed to the left which implies that the decline in ratios is due to some firms 
who had deep cuts in dividend payouts after the tax law change. This makes it 
difficult to make any general statement about the effect of the tax law change 
on dividend payout ratios in France.
There is no significant difference between the pre-law and post-law 
payout ratios in Germany and U.S. This conclusion is supported by the three 
tests. It is predicted that the dividend payout ratios in Germany and U.S. 
shouM decline after the tax law change but these results suggest that the tax 
law change in both countries did not have any significant impact on dividend 
payout ratios. Firms and investors did not think that the relative changes in 
both options were significant enough to affect their preference for dividend 
income or capital gains. The U.S. result is consistent with Abruntyn and Turner 
(1990) and Bolster and Janjigian (1991) that find no significant difference 
between the pre and post law dividend ratios in U.S. but contradicts Gordon 
and Mackie-Mason (1990) that found a significant increase in dividend payout 
ratios in U.S. after the tax law change.
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Hie results of the three "mean difference tests" indicate that there is a 
significant decline in dividend payout ratios in Japan after the tax law change. It 
can therefore be concluded that the tax law change significantly decreased the 
dividend payout ratios in Japan because it favored the payment of less 
dividends.
The trends in the dividend payout ratios in the five countries are shown in 
Figures 1 through 5 as a visual aid. There appears to be significant movement 
in payout ratios in the year of the change in Australia and France. There was a 
sharp increase in Australia and a sharp decline in France even though there 
was a fairly stable trend before the tax law change.
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Figure 1: Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in Australia
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 2: Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in France
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 3: Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in Germany
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 4: Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in Japan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 5: Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in United States
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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VI. Adjustment of the Dividend Payout Ratios for Macro 
Economic Variables
It is possible that dividend payout ratios are influenced by macro 
economic variables. There is no documentation of any study, to my 
knowledge, that has adjusted the dividend payout ratios for macro economic 
effects. I selected and examined variables that are likely to influence dividend 
payouts. These variables are interest rates, gross national product (GNP) and 
growth rate of GNP. If it is established that these variables affect dividend 
payout ratios, they can be used as covariates to obtain the adjusted means for 
the payout ratios. In order to do this, there has to be a consistent relationship 
between dividend payout ratios and the covariates. These relationships are 
examined by regressing dividend payout ratios on each of the proposed 
covariates. The regressions show that there is no significant relationship 
between dividend payout ratios and GNP or GNP growth in all the countries. 
There is a weak negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and 
interest rates (the higher the interest rates the lower the dividend payout ratios). 
A possible explanation of the observed negative relationship is that during 
periods of high interest rates, it becomes cheaper for firms to use internal 
financing. Firms therefore conserve their cash flow for further investment by 
retaining larger proportions of earnings. This results in low dividend payout 
ratios.
Therefore interest rates are used as a covariate to adjust for macro
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economic effects using covariance analysis (the results of the adjusted means 
are given in Table 10). A t-test shows that the changes in dividend payout 
ratios for Germany and U.S. are insignificant while the changes in payout ratios 
for Australia and France and Japan are significant The dividend payout ratio 
for Australia increased from 48.56% to 56.63%. There was a decrease in the 
dividend payout ratio in France from a pre-law mean of 27.08% to post-law of 
22.75%. Germany’s dividend payout ratio changed from a pre-law average of 
50.59% to a post-law average of 52.96%, while Japan’s ratio changed from a 
pre-law of 34.15% to a post-law of 32.14%. The pre and post tax law dividend 
payout ratios for U.S. are 31.64% and 31.35% respectively. The unadjusted 
means shown in Table 9 are very similar to the adjusted means. This implies 
that dividend payout ratios are not affected very much by interest rates in the 
five countries.
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Table 11: The Adjusted Pre and Post Tax Law Means of Dividend
Payout Ratios
I
Country Pre-Tax Law Mean Post-Tax Law Mean
Australia 0.4856 0.5663
France 0.2708 0.2275
Germany 0.5059 0.5296
Japan 0.3415 0.3214
U.S. 0.3164 0.3135
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The dividend payout ratios in the years before the tax law changes are 
also examined for any lag effects. Talmor and Titman (1990) suggest that 
investors’ preference for cash dividends or deferred income may be influenced 
by future changes in tax laws. Investors who would normally realize capital 
gains may decide to receive immediate dividend income rather than realize 
future capital gains that may be taxed at a higher rate due to an announced or 
anticipated tax law change and vice versa. It is therefore important that any 
possibility of such lag effects be examined. This is achieved by comparing the 
dividend payout ratios in the year that the announcement of a tax law change 
was made to the mean of the pre-announcement payout ratios. If there is a lag 
effect there should be a significant change in the year that the tax law change 
was announced. This means that most of the effect of the tax law change will 
take place in the announcement year rather than the year the tax law change 
actually took effect The tax law change in Australia was announced in 1985 
and became effective in 1987. The tax law change in France was announced in 
1987. Germany and Japan’s tax law changes were announced in 1988. The 
content of the Tax reform Act in U.S. was announced in 1986. No significant 
lag effects are found for any country.
Khoury and Smith (1977) claim that changes in tax laws can be captured 
by dividend growth rates. Tax law changes that reduced the tax disadvantage 
of dividend income should lead to increases in dividend growth rates while tax 
law changes that increased the tax disadvantage of dividend income should
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lead to decreases in dividend growth rates. Dividend growth rates are therefore 
examined to see the direction of the growth rates. Khoury and Smith’s claim 
suggests that the dividend growth rates in France, Germany, Japan and U.S 
should decrease after the tax law. The Australian dividend growth rates should 
increase if we assume that the dividend taxes are paid, otherwise the dividend 
growth rates should remain the same.
The results show that there are insignificant change in dividend growth 
rates for Australia, Germany, Japan and U.S. while there is a significant 
decrease in the dividend growth rate in France. The dividend growth rate in 
France declined by more than 50% in the year of the tax law change. The 
French result is consistent with the prediction. The Australian result is also 
consistent with the prediction that assumes investors did not pay taxes on their 
income before the tax law change. The pre and post tax law dividend growth 
rates are shown in Table 11.
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Table 12: The Pre and post Tax Law Means of the Dividend Growth Rates
Country Pre-Tax Law 
Change Mean
Post-Tax Law 
Change Mean
Paired*
T-Test
S-Test W-Test
Australia 0.1135 0.1441 0.19 0.31 0.35
France 0.1301 0.0655 0.09** 0.01** 0.00**
Germany 0.0716 0.0738 0.48 0.22 0.17
Japan 0.0508 0.0552 0.32 0.37 0.11
U.S. 0.0569 0.0574 0.48 0.21 0.16
*The numbers reported are the p-values. 
**Denotes significance at 5% level.
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VII. Summary
The contradictory results of the "means difference" tests make it difficult 
to draw any conclusions on the effect of tax law changes on dividend payout 
ratios. The Australian result is consistent with the prediction that assumes that 
investors avoided paying taxes before the tax law change. The direction of the 
change in dividend payout ratios for France is consistent with the prediction but 
the significance of the change is not confirmed by all three "means difference" 
tests. The paired t-test finds the change significant while the non-parametric 
tests find it insignificant The changes in dividend payout ratios in Germany and 
U.S. are insignificant and inconsistent with the predictions. Japan’s result is 
consistent with the predictions and the three "means difference" confirm the 
significance of the results. Dividend payout ratios declined in Japan after the 
tax law change. The results in this section are therefore inconclusive and no 
general inference can be made on the effect of tax law changes on dividend 
payout ratios.
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CHAPTER 6
TAX EFFECTS HYPOTHESIS ON THE VALUE OF A FIRM
I. Introduction
Some authors believe that dividend policy affects the value of a firm 
because of tax effects. The tax effects hypothesis says that dividends have a 
negative effect on the value of a firm. In countries where capital gains are taxed 
at a lower rate than dividend income, firms that pay large dividends are 
expected to offer higher returns to compensate for the higher taxes paid on 
dividends. These firms therefore should have lower stock prices and firm 
values. The tax effects hypothesis therefore implies that the relationship 
between expected return and dividend yield should be positive in countries 
where dividend income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains and negative 
in countries where capital gains are taxed at a higher rate than dividend income. 
The predictions made in the next section should hold if the tax effects 
hypothesis is valid.
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II. Hypotheses
The tax calculations in Chapter 3 show that investors in all tax brackets in 
Japan and U.S. preferred unrealized capital gains to dividend income before 
and after the tax law changes. If the tax hypothesis is correct, we should 
expect to see a positive relationship between expected return and dividend yield 
in these countries before and after the tax law change.
The Australian tax calculations show that investors in all tax brackets 
preferred unrealized capital gains to dividend income before the tax law change 
if dividend taxes were paid but indifferent to both options if dividend taxes were 
not paid. This implies that there may be a positive or insignificant relationship 
between expected return and dividend yield before the tax law change. After 
the tax law change, investors in all tax brackets were indifferent to the dividend 
income and unrealized capital gains options. An insignificant relationship 
between expected return and dividend yield is therefore expected after the tax 
law change.
In France and Germany, some investors preferred dividend income while 
others preferred capital gains before and after the tax law change. This 
suggests that the relationship between expected return and dividend yield is 
ambiguous. The marginal investors will determine foe relationship between foe 
two variables. There should be a positive relationship between expected return 
and dividend yield if foe marginal investors’ effective tax rate on dividend 
income is higher than that on capital gains while there should be a negative
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relationship if the marginal investors’ effective tax rate on dividend income is 
lower than that on capital gains.
The coefficient of the dividend yield in the CAPM (discussed in the next 
section) is defined as the marginal effective tax difference between ordinary 
income and capital gains. If the tax law change increased the relative tax 
disadvantage associated with dividend income, the marginal tax difference 
between dividend income and capital gains should also increase. This change 
is expected because investors should demand a higher expected return to 
compensate for the higher tax difference between dividend income and capital 
gains. The dividend yield coefficient should therefore increase. Conversely, if 
the tax law change reduced the relative tax disadvantage of dividend income, 
the marginal tax difference should decrease and the dividend yield coefficient is 
expected to decrease.
In Australia, the expected change of the dividend yield coefficient 
depends on whether dividend income taxes were paid before the tax law 
change. If taxes were paid on dividend income, the tax calculations showed 
that the tax law change reduced the tax disadvantage of dividend income. This 
leads to the prediction that the coefficient on the dividend yield should decrease 
after the tax law change. However, if dividend income taxes were not paid, 
there should be an insignificant change in the dividend yield coefficient
The tax calculations indicate that the tax law change increased the tax 
disadvantage of dividend income relative to capital gains for all investors in
82
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France (except for investors in the lowest tax bracket) and Germany, it is 
therefore predicted that the dividend yield coefficient should increase after the 
tax law change in France and Germany.
The tax calculations also suggest that the tax law change increased the 
tax disadvantage of dividend income relative to capital gains for most investors 
in Japan and U.S. The dividend yield coefficient is therefore expected to 
increase in these countries after the tax law change.
III. Methodology
The use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in testing the 
relationship between dividend yield and expected return has become a standard 
practice. Brennan (1970), Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and Scholes (1982), 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979 and 1982) used the CAPM to test this 
relationship.
The CAPM is an equilibrium asset pricing model that tries to establish a 
consistent relationship between risk and expected return. Securities that have 
high risk are expected to provide higher rates of return while those with low risk 
are expected to provide lower rates of return. The relevant risk in pricing 
securities is the systematic risk (market related risk) which cannot be diversified 
away. This model uses beta (B) to measure the systematic risk of a security. 
Beta is defined as the covariance between the asset return and the market 
return divided by the variance of the market return. The CAPM says that the
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required rate of return on any security is a linear function of the beta of that 
security. The CAPM is usually expressed as:
*<*!.*>  = &e.t +  4
where E(R, t) is the expected return on security i in period t,
R,t is the short term risk-free rate in period t,
/3,t is the beta for security i in period t and 
E(Rm t) is the expected return on the market portfolio in period t  
Brennan (1970) extended the CAPM to incorporate the effects of 
personal taxes paid on dividends. His after-tax CAPM states that the expected 
return of a security is a function of the security's risk characteristics (beta) and 
its expected dividend yield. Brennan’s after-tax CAPM is given as follows:
Rl.  t ~ Re,e = 3^COV{Rl t t  , Ra>e) (DYit t ~ Rf t t ) .....................................5
where R, t is the rate of return on the ith security in period t,
R, t is the return on a risk-free asset in period t, 
a1 is the marginal effect of risk in period t,
COV(Rl t,Rm t) is the covariance of the security’s return with the 
market’s return in period t,
3^ is the marginal effective tax difference between ordinary income and
capital gains rate and
DY, t is the dividend yield in period t
His interpretation of this model is that for a given level of risk, investors
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require higher returns from securities that pay large dividends to compensate 
for the differential tax treatment between dividend income and capital gains.
The general after-tax CAPM equation used to test the relationship 
between the value of a firm and dividend policy is given as:
*i.e " Rt . t  = a0 + + " Rf . J  + ci .t ...............................................6
where R, t is the before-tax return on the ith security in period t,
Rjt is the return on the risk-free asset in period t,
a„ is the constant term,
a, is the marginal effect of risk,
B, t is the systematic risk of the ith security in period t,
% is the marginal effective tax difference between ordinary income and 
capital gains rate,
DY, t is the dividend yield in period t and 
eit is the error term in period t  
A complete derivation of this model is given in Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979). The major assumptions that underlie the derivation of 
the model as detailed by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) are:
1. Investors are rational and risk averse and therefore maximize utility in a 
mean variance domain.
2. Security rates of return have a multivariate normal distribution.
3. Investors have homogenous expectations. This implies that investors
have identical expectations in terms of expected return and variance
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because they have the same information about ail securities.
4. Transaction costs are insignificant
5. There are no restrictions on short sales of securities. Investors can sell 
securities they do not own and use the proceeds to buy other securities.
6. Individuals are price takers. An individual’s buying or selling action 
cannot affect the price of a stock.
7. All assets are marketable which implies that all assets, including human 
capital, can be bought and sold.
8. A riskless asset paying a constant rate exists. An investor can lend or 
borrow an unlimited amount of funds at the risk-free rate.
9. Dividends on securities are paid at the end of the period.
10. Income taxes are progressive and the marginal tax rate is a continuous 
function of taxable income.
11. There are no taxes on capital gains. This assumption is based on the 
fact that capital gains taxes are only paid if realized.
Some of these assumptions do not realistically describe the behavior of capital 
markets. However, the CAPM still holds if some of the assumptions are 
relaxed. Elton and Gruber show that the CAPM is very robust to the violation of 
some of the assumptions. They relaxed assumptions 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and are 
able to obtain similar results.
The first step in the CAPM is to estimate the beta of individual securities 
for the period of study. This is done by regressing the stock return in excess of
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the risk-free rate (R, - Fy on the excess return on the market portfolio 
(Rfnt'  Rft)- A portfolio of securities that is riskier than the market portfolio is 
expected to yield a higher return than the market return while one that is not as 
risky as the market portfolio should provide lower returns. The market portfolio 
is not observable, so proxies are used. The commonly used proxies are the 
New York Stock Exchange Index, the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, or the 
AMEX Index.
The second step is to regress the portfolio’s excess return on the 
obtained beta and the difference between the dividend yield and the risk free 
rate (DY„ - R„). However, capturing risk with beta has received a lot of criticism 
(see Roll 1977). Some of the criticisms are as follows:
1. The true market portfolio is not observable and cannot be determined to 
be efficient or not
2. Using proxies for the market portfolio may lead to inferences that are not 
necessarily true. The validity of the CAPM and the efficiency of the 
market portfolio is a joint hypothesis that is difficult to test because the 
market portfolio is not observable. If a particular test does not support 
the CAPM this may mean that the ex-post portfolio used to estimate beta 
is not efficient or that foe predicted linear relationship between beta and 
expected return does not hold.
3. Beta does not explain most of the variation of the returns of securities. 
These criticisms led to the search for alternative risk variables. Banz
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(1981) suggests that the unexplained variation of a security’s expected return 
can be explained by a size effect Bhandari (1988) concludes that leverage is 
important in predicting expected return. Basu (1983) claims that the eamings- 
price (E/P) ratio is an important factor in evaluating the variations in expected 
returns. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) and Chan, Hamao, and 
Lakonishok (1991) conclude that the ratio of a firm’s book value of common 
equity (BE) to its market value of equity (ME) explains the variation of expected 
returns better than beta.
Fama and French (1992) evaluate all the risk variables suggested above. 
Their major conclusions are:
1. The performance of the beta-based regression is poor and unstable over 
time.
2. The size of the firm measured by the market value of equity and the 
book-to-market value of equity explain the variation of expected returns 
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ better than beta.
3. The ratio of book-to-market value of equity had a higher explanatory 
power than the size variable.
Based on the above results, a modified version of the after-tax CAPM is 
used in this study. The risk variables are size (measured by the market value of 
equity) and the ratio of book-to-market value of equity. The market value of 
equity is defined as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the price of 
the stock. Market value is a proxy for firm size. The size effect has received
88
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considerable attention in the literature with the documentation of a negative 
relationship between size and returns. Smaller firms offer higher expected 
returns than bigger firms. This has been attributed to the feet that smaller firms 
are less stable and therefore viewed by investors as being more risky. In order 
to attract investors, smaller firms must offer higher expected returns. Therefore 
the relationship between size and expected return should be negative.
The other risk variable is foe ratio of book value of equity to market value 
of equity (BE/ME). This variable can be used to measure foe performance of 
firms. A low (BE/ME) ratio means that foe market value is greater than foe 
book value of common equity and is an indication that foe firm is doing well.
On foe other hand, a high ratio means that foe firm’s stock price is low and 
may be a sign that foe firm is in distress. Fama and French (1992) suggest that 
foe risk captured by foe (BE/ME) ratio may be foe relative distress factor 
presented in Chan and Chen (1991). The relationship between this risk variable 
and returns is expected to be positive.
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Univariate and multivariate cross sectional regressions are run with the 
two risk variables. The models are as follows:
Rl . t  -  R f . t  = *o + e + -  Rf t t ) + el t t ....................................... 7
B E
Ri . t  -  R f . t  = A> + b i - z r *  + b z W i . t  -  R f . t )  *  ui#e.........................................8
B E .  r
R f . t  -  R f . t  = «o + + + a 3^DYl . t  -  R f . t )  *  * i . t  9
where R, t is the before-tax return on the ith security in period t,
R, t is the return on the risk-free asset in period tr 
a,,, b0 and a0 are the constant terms, 
av b1t a1 and a2 are the marginal risk effects,
ME, t is the market value of equity in period t,
BE* is the book value of equity in period t,
a^ b2 and a3 are the marginal effective tax differences between
ordinary income and capital gains rates,
DY, t is the expected dividend yield in period t, and 
e,t, u,t and n,t are the error terms.
Annual dividend yields are used in the regressions and they are defined as the 
annual dividend per share divided by the stock price at the end of the fiscal 
year. The expected dividend yield for year t is the dividend yield of the previous 
year. The annual dividend yield has the advantage of ensuring that any price 
adjustments, information, or tax accrual effects must have had time to stabilize.
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Jose and Stevens (1989) argue that there is a possibility that tax effects accrue 
gradually over a period of time. The use of short run measures (such as the 
quarterly dividend yield) may therefore lead to erroneous results that only reflect 
short run price adjustments that are not permanent The market value of equity 
is the value at the end of the fiscal year.
Cross sectional regressions are run for the pre and post tax law periods 
and for the nine-year period in each country using Ordinary Least Squares and 
the Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Regressions by Black and Scholes (1974), 
Litzenberger, R.H. and K. Ramaswamy (1979,1982), etc., grouped securities 
into portfolios in order to reduce the estimation error and the non-stationarity 
problems associated with estimated beta. This portfolio grouping is not 
necessary in this study since beta is not being used.
V. Results
The results of the regressions for the entire period (1984 -1991) are 
given in Table 1211. The relationship between dividend yield and expected 
return is positive for France, Germany, Japan and U.S. This relationship is 
significant in the three models. Australia is the only country with an insignificant 
relationship between dividend yield and expected return. The coefficients of 
market value of equity are negative while the coefficients of the ratio of book-to-
11These are Maximum Likelihood Estimation results. There is no significant difference 
between these results and the Ordinary Least Squares results.
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market value of equity are positive for all countries. These are the expected 
signs and most of the coefficients are significant
The pre and post tax law regression results are shown in Table 13. The 
dividend yield coefficients are positive and significant in France, Japan and the 
U.S. both before and after the tax law change in the univariate and multivariate 
regressions. The relationship between dividend yield and expected return in 
Australia is insignificant before and after the tax law change. There is an 
insignificant relationship between expected return and dividend yield in Germany 
before the tax law change. After the tax law change, this relationship is positive 
and significant in the univariate regressions but only significant at the 15% level 
in the multivariate regression.
The pre and post tax law regressions results show that the change in 
dividend yield coefficient in Japan and U.S. is insignificant in the three 
regressions and inconsistent with the prediction. The change in the dividend 
yield coefficient for France and Germany is significant12 in all the three 
regressions and is consistent with the prediction. The insignificant change in 
the coefficient for Australia is also consistent with the prediction that assumes 
that there was widespread evasion of taxes before the tax law change. These
12The formula used to test for significance of a change in the dividend yield coefficient 
is given as Z = (B2 - B , ) / ^  - s2fl1) where Z is approximately normally distributed 
because the number of firms is large in the countries. B2 and B1 are the post and pre 
tax law dividend yield coefficients while s2^  and s2B1 are the estimated standard errors.
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results are generally consistent with the predictions about the change in the 
dividend yield coefficients.
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Table 13: Regressions of Expected Return on Market Value of Equity,
Ratio of Book-to-Market Value of Equity and Dividend Yield 
Between 1984 and 1991
Country Coeff. of DY Coeff. of ME Coeff. of BE/ME
Australia -0.18 -0.08
(-0.46) (-4.05)
-0.40 0.25
(-1.07) (5.03)
-0.32 -0.05 0.21
(•0.86) (-2.43) (3.79)
France 6.21 -0.12
(5.86) (-7.00)
5.07 0.24
(4.72) (6.79)
5.52 -0.09 0.15
(5.16) (-4.12) (3.50)
Germany 3.49 -0.04
(5.22) (-3.54)
2.58 0.15
(3.71) (4.88)
2.52 -0.04 0.14
(3.66) (-3.15) (4.60)
Japan 8.59 -0.06
(14.28) (-6.86)
8.11 0.13
(13.16) (7.36)
7.64 -0.04 0.10
(12.31) (-5.00) (5.67)
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Table 13 Continued
Country Coeff. of DY Coeff. of ME Coeff. of BE/ME
U.S. 3.19 -0.04
(2.00) (-1.94)
2.94 0.03
(8.22) (1.92)
3.13 -0.01 0.02
(8.07) (-1.26) (1-15) I
T-statistics in parentheses
Coeff. of DY is the coefficient of dividend yield.
Coeff. of ME is the coefficient of market value of equity.
Coeff. of BE/ME is the coefficient of the ratio of book-to-market value of equity.
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TABLE 14: Pre and Post Tax Law Regressions of Expected Return on 
Market Value of Equity, Ratio of Book-to-Market Value of 
Equity and Dividend Yield (1984*1991)
Country Pre-Tax Law Period Post-Tax Law Period
DY ME BE/ME DY ME BE/ME
Australia -0.12
(-0.12)
-0.11
(-2.87)
-0.12
(-0.28)
-0.04
(-1.47)
0.31
(0.36)
0.19
(1.92)
-0.38
(-0.88)
0.24
(3.25)
-0.48
(-0.47)
-0.10
(-2.55)
0.14
(1.42)
-0.35
(-0.80)
-0.03
(-0.86)
0.22
(3.00)
France 4.80
(3.06)
-0.12
(-4.68)
6.88
(6.22)
-0.03
(-1.49)
4.10
(2.61)
0.24
(4.94)
6.21
(5.36)
0.04
(0.77)
4.54
(2.89)
-0.08
(-2.41)
0.15
(2.57)
6.39
(5.50)
-0.03
(-1.54)
0.02
(0.34)
Germany -0.48
(-0.43)
-0.03
(-2.45)
2.87
(2.09)
-0.02
(-0.95)
-1.92
(-1.34)
0.19
(5.19)
1.97
(1.73)
0.04
(0.98)
-1.74
(-1.37)
-0.02
(-1.79)
0.18
(4.89)
2.28
(1.51)
-0.02
(-0.94)
0.04
(0.97)
Japan 4.51
(4.37)
-0.04
(-3.38)
2.51
(4.21)
-0.10
(-7.86)
3.73
(3.59)
0.11
(4.87)
1.32
(5.73)
0.17
(6.45)
3.86
(3.71)
-0.02
(-1.86)
0.09
(3.96)
3.51
(5.43)
-0.09
(-7.70)
0.16
(6.26)
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Table 14 Continued
| Country Pre-Tax Law Period Post-Tax Law Period
DY ME BE/ME DY ME BE/ME
U.S. 5.03
(1.23)
-0.10
(-1.71)
2.71
(5.08)
-0.01
(-1.70)
4.16
(9.33)
-0.05
(-2.84)
2.27
(4.35)
0.06
(3.28)
4.47
(9.24)
-0.01
(-1.64)
-0.06
(-3.20)
2.30
(4.09)
■0.001
(-0.12)
0.06
(2.74)
T-statistics in parentheses
DY is the coefficient of dividend yield.
ME is the coefficient of market value of equity.
BE/ME is the coefficient of the ratio of book-to-market value of equity.
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IV. Interpretation of Results
The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between expected return and dividend yield in France, Germany, Japan and 
U.S. for the whole period. These results imply that stocks that pay high 
dividends generally have low stock prices. This is consistent with the tax effects 
hypothesis. The Australian cross sectional regression reveals an insignificant 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield. The Australian 
investors expect comparable returns from stocks that pay high or low 
dividends.
The focus of this study is on the relationship between expected returns 
and dividend yield before and after the tax law change. The results show that 
there is an insignificant relationship between expected return and dividend yield 
before and after the tax law change in Australia The insignificant relation 
between expected return before the tax law change is consistent with the 
prediction that assumes taxes on dividend income were not paid before the tax 
law change. This insignificant relationship suggests that the high tax rate on 
dividend income was of no consequence since these taxes were not paid. The 
insignificant relationship after the tax law change is expected and is consistent 
with the tax effects hypothesis.
The positive and significant dividend yield coefficients obtained for Japan 
and U.S. before and after the tax law change is also consistent with the 
predictions of the tax effects hypothesis. These results suggest that investors
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demand higher returns from stocks that pay high dividends. This also implies 
that dividends have a negative effect on the value of a firm.
The positive relationship found between expected return and dividend 
yield in France and Germany supports the tax effects hypothesis and also 
suggests that marginal investors may be in the higher tax brackets. The tax 
calculations show that the relationship between expected return and dividend 
yield in France and Germany is ambiguous because some investors preferred 
dividend income while others preferred capital gains. Investors in the lower tax 
brackets were better off with dividend income than capital gains while investors 
in the higher tax brackets were better off with capital gains in France before and 
after the tax law change. If the marginal investors are in lower tax brackets, the 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield should have been 
negative. But the results reveal a positive relationship between the two 
variables before and after the tax law change which implies that the marginal 
investor may be in the higher tax brackets. In Germany, the relationship 
between expected return before the tax law change should be insignificant if the 
marginal investor is in the top tax bracket because the effective tax rate on 
dividend income and capital gains are the same in this tax bracket However, 
the relationship between the two variables should be positive after the tax law 
change, if the marginal investor is in the higher tax brackets. The results show 
that the relationship expected return and dividend yield is insignificant before the 
tax law change and positive and significant at the 15% level after the tax law
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change.
It is also interesting to observe that there is a shift in the dividend yield 
coefficients after the tax law change. In France and Germany, there is a 
significant increase in the coefficient of dividend yield and these are two of the 
four countries that increased the tax disadvantage associated with dividend 
income after the tax law change. The change in the dividend yield coefficient 
for Australia is insignificant This is the country where the tax law change did 
not significantly change the tax position of investors if it is assumed that taxes 
were not paid. The changes in the dividend yield coefficient for Japan and U.S 
are insignificant and are inconsistent with the predictions.
The results of the changes in the dividend yield coefficients are also 
consistent with Poterba and Summers (1984) that conclude that the 1973 
change in dividend taxation in Britain had a substantial effect on the premium 
required by investors on firms that paid high dividends. Investors demanded a 
higher expected return after a tax law change that increased the tax 
disadvantage of dividend income was introduced. Ang, Blackwell and 
Megginson (1991) also report that in Britain, stocks sold at a premium before 
the tax law change when the tax law favored capital gains. However, the same 
stocks sold at a discount when a tax law change that reduced the tax 
advantage of capital gains was introduced.
The coefficients of market value of equity and the ratio of book-to-market 
value of equity have the expected signs in a!! the countries. Market value of
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equity has a negative and significant relationship with expected return and this 
is consistent with the results of Fama and French (1992). Smaller firms are 
perceived to be risky and therefore generally have higher expected returns. 
The coefficients of the ratio of book-to-market value of equity are positive and 
significant Firms that have low (BE/ME) ratios provide lower expected returns 
because they are perceived to be doing well. Firms that have high (BE/ME) 
ratios, on the other hand, are perceived as distressed firms and need to offer 
higher returns to attract investors. These two risk variables are significant in 
explaining the expected return on stocks with the ratio of (BE/ME) generally 
having a higher explanatory power.
V. Summary
The results of this section provide evidence in support of the tax effects 
hypothesis. The relationship between expected return and dividend yield is 
positive and significant in France, Japan and U.S. These are countries that tax 
dividend income at a higher rate than capital gains. On the other hand, the 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield is insignificant in 
Australia and Germany (before the tax law change). Investors in these 
countries were indifferent to the dividend income and unrealized capital gains 
options because the two options were taxed at the same rate. The conclusion 
is further strengthened by the results of the changes in the coefficient of 
dividend yield. Trie dividend yield coefficient increased in France and Germany
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which are two of the four countries that increased the tax disadvantage of 
dividend income. The change in the yield coefficient in Australia is insignificant 
and this is the expected result because the tax law change did not change the 
tax position of investors. The results also suggest that the marginal investors 
may be in the top tax brackets.
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CHAPTER 7
UNTNER’S PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL
I. Introduction
Lintner (1956) derives a dividend behavioral model that is used to 
describe the dividend behavior of U.S. firms. The last part of this work 
evaluates how well Lintner’s partial adjustment model describes the dividend 
behavior of firms in other countries.
II. Methodology
Lintner (1956) examines the variables that influence the dividend 
policies of firms. His findings indicate that firms have long term target dividend 
payout ratios; the dividend change from year to year is more important than the 
absolute amount of dividends paid in a given year; and that managers are 
reluctant to make dividend changes that may have to be reversed within a short 
period. Lintner used these findings to develop a partial adjustment model.
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Limner’s model is given as:
i . t  = & i + C t l D l t  -  Dl t t ^ )  + ui t t ..............................................................................10
where *Di t is the change in dividends for firm i in period t,
c, is the speed of adjustment to the difference between a target 
dividend payout and last year’s payout,
D* t is the target dividend payout in period t,
D,M is last period’s dividend payout in period t-1,
a, is the constant term and
u, t is a normally distributed random error.
=  Xi.J i.t .................................................................................................................................................................................11
where r, t is the desired payout ratio in period t and 
y, t is the current earnings.
This equation says that the amount of dividends paid in a given year is a 
proportion of the earnings for that year. This implies that firms adjust partially to 
changes in earnings while determining the amount of dividends to be paid. 
Equation 10 can be written as:
A ^ i . t  = * CiZiYi.t ~ cPi.t-x + * i . t ...............................................................12
The actual regression used by Lintner is
D i . t  = *>i *  ~ *A .e-i + ui.t ....................................................................................13
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
From equation (13) the partial adjustment coefficient (speed of 
adjustment) and the long-run payout ratios can be calculated. The partial 
adjustment coefficient reflects how test a firm adjusts its dividend payment 
toward the target ratio. The partial adjustment coefficient and long run payout 
ratio are as follows:
The partial adjustment coefficient = 1 - b213 
The long run payout ratio = b,/(1 - b^.
Estimation intervals are obtained for the speed of adjustment These intervals 
are used to calculate a range for the calculated payout ratios to account for 
estimation errors.
Nakamura and Nakamura (1989) claim that the addition of a size variable 
improves the forecasting ability of Lintner’s model. A size variable measured by 
market value of equity is therefore added in Lintner’s partial adjustment as a 
second model. This model is given as:
D i . t  = A> + *>i Y i . t  -  * A . c - i  + b 3M E l i t  + Ui / £ ..................................................... 14
where D, t is the current dividends for firm i in period t,
Y, t is the current earnings for firm i in period t,
DiM is last period’s dividend payout for firm i,
ME, t is the market value of equity for firm i in period t,
%  is the coefficient of dividends per share and b1 is the coefficient of earnings per 
share.
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b0 is the constant term and
u, t is a normally distributed random error.
Earning per share (EPS) and cash flow per share (CFS) are used in the 
two models. The cash flow variable is used to test Brittain’s claim that the use 
of cash flow provides a better predictive power than the use of earnings per 
share in Lintner’s model.
III. Results
The results of the partial adjustment models for each country are given in 
Table 14. Lintner’s model is able to explain 64.86% of the dividend behavior in 
Australia, 80.49% in France, 62.81% in Germany, 91.67% in Japan and 88.01% 
in U.S. The cash flow model explains 40.61% of the dividend behavior in 
Australia, 78.60% in France, 59.53% in Germany, and 88.97% in U.S. The 
earnings per share model that incorporates a size variable explains 64.76% of 
dividend behavior in Australia, 80.56% in France, 63.52% in Germany, 91.69% in 
Japan and 88.85% in U.S., while the cash flow counterpart explains 43.16% in 
Australia, 78.83% in France, 60.58% in Germany, and 88.97% in U.S. The cash 
flow model was not run in Japan because of a lack of complete data for cash 
flows. The reported coefficients of correlation (R2) are the adjusted R2.
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Table 15: Regressions of the Partial Adjustment Models
COUNTRY INT DSLAG1 EPS CFS ME R2 DW
Australia 0.01 0.68 0.19 64.86% 2.14
-0.01 0.68 0.19 0.002 64.76% 2.15
0.02 0.56 0.099 40.61% 2.19
-0.33 0.54 0.075 0.028 43.16% 2.19
France 1.36 0.92 0.02 80.49% 1.94
-4.36 0.91 0.02 0.393 80.56% 1.94
1.14 0.94 0.006 78.60% 1.90
-7.72 0.92 0.001 0.61 78.83% 1.90
Germany 1.41 0.70 0.07 62.81% 2.11
-2.34 0.68 0.06 0.294 63.52% 2.13
1.32 0.75 0.013 59.53% 2.10
-3.27 0.72 0.008 0.368 60.58% 2.13
Japan 0.51 0.91 0.02 91.67% 1.99
-1.15 0.90 0.02 91.69% 1.99
U.S. 0.05 0.93 0.01 88.01% 2.02
-0.41 0.87 0.01 -0.013 88.85% 2.01
0.07 0.99 -0.013 87.71% 2.03
-0.51 0.93 -0.013 -0.013 88.97% 2.00
INT Is the Intercept of the regression
DSLAG1 is the lag of dividends per share
EPS is earnings per share
CFS is cash flow per share
ME la the market value of equity
F? is the adjusted coefficient of determination
DW is the Durbin-Wbteon statistics.
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The calculated long term payout ratios and the speed of adjustment for 
the five countries are given in Table 15. The speed of adjustments for Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan and U.S are 32%, 8%, 30%, 9% and 7% respectively. 
The estimation interval for the speed of adjustment is (21%-43%) for Australia; 
(7%-23%) for France; (13%-48%) for Germany; (7%-25%) for Japan and (3%- 
11%) for U.S. The calculated long term payout ratios are 59.38% (44%-88%)14 
for Australia; 25% (9%-29%) for France; 23% (15%-54%) for Germany; 22.22% 
(8%-28%) for Japan and 28.57% (9%-33%) for U.S15.
14The numbers in parentheses are the calculated range for the payout ratios.
15The range for the payout ratios are calculated by dividing the coefficients of the 
earnings variable obtained in Lintner’s model by the upper and lower limits obtained for 
the estimation interval of the speed of adjustments.
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Table 16: Coefficients of Partial Adjustment and Speed of Adjustment
Country b1 b2 Speed of Long Run
Adjustment Payout Ratio
Australia 0.19 0.68 32.0% 59.38%
France 0.02 0.92 8.0% 25.00%
Germany 0.07 0.70 30.0% 23.00%
Japan 0.02 0.91 9.0% 22.22%
U.S. 0.01 0.93 7.0% 28.57%
b, is the coefficient of earnings per share 
is the coefficient of dividends per share 
Speed of adjustment = 1 - 
Long run payout ratio -  b ,/l • bfe).
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IV. Interpretation of Results
For all countries, the predictive power of the earnings per share models 
are slightly higher than those of the cash flow models except in Australia where 
the EPS model has a significantly higher R2. This is contrary to Brittain’s results 
that conclude that cash flow models have better predictive power than earnings 
per share models.
The intercepts in the regressions are positive. This is consistent with 
Lintner’s results which show that the intercepts are positive to reflect the fact 
that firms are very reluctant to cut dividend payments. The earnings per share 
variable and last year’s dividend are the most significant factors in explaining 
the dividend policy of firms. The size variable does not add very much to the 
explanatory power of the regressions.
The calculated payout ratios for Australia, France and U.S. are not 
significantly different from the actual payout ratios but for Germany and Japan, 
the calculated payout ratios are lower than the actual payout ratios. The payout 
ratios are, however, within the calculated range.
Australia’s and Germany’s speed of adjustments are the highest among 
the five countries. This means that these countries adjust their dividend 
payments very quickly to changes in earnings.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Summary
There are some significant differences in dividend payout ratios, dividend 
yields and dividend growth rates between Australia, France, Germany, Japan 
and United States between 1983 and 1991. Australia has the highest dividend 
payout ratios, dividend yield and dividend growth rates. The French dividend 
payout ratios are the lowest while the Japanese dividend yield and dividend 
growth rates are the lowest
The tax effects hypothesis is used to make predictions on the effects of 
tax law changes on dividend payout ratios. It is predicted that the payout ratios 
in France, Germany, Japan and U.S. should decrease while there should be an 
no significant change in the payout ratios in Australia if it is assumed that 
dividend income taxes were not paid before the tax law change. The paired t- 
test, the Sign test and the Wilcoxon sign rank tests are used to test for 
significant changes after the tax law change. The results show that there were 
insignificant changes in dividend payout ratios in Australia, Germany and U.S. 
The dividend payout ratios decreased in France but the three tests used to test
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for significant changes provide contradictory results which makes it difficult to 
make any general inferences. There was also a significant decrease in dividend 
payout ratios in Japan and the three tests confirm this significance. The results 
of the effects of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios are therefore 
generally inconclusive.
The dividend payout ratios were also adjusted for macro economic 
effects by using interest rates as a covariate and the means of the adjusted and 
unadjusted payout ratios are similar. This suggests that interest rates do not 
affect payout ratios.
The validity of the tax effects hypothesis is also tested by examining the 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield using a modified 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. The relationship between expected return and 
dividend yield in Japan and U.S. before and after the tax law change is positive 
and significant These countries have higher total effective tax rates on dividend 
income than on capital gains. The relationship between expected return and 
dividend yield is insignificant in Australia before and after the tax law change. 
This is also consistent with the tax effects hypothesis because shareholders in 
Australia are supposed to be indifferent to dividend income or capital gains if 
they do not pay dividend income taxes. The insignificant relationship in 
Germany (before the tax law change) and the positive relationship in France 
and Germany (after the tax law change) suggest that the marginal investors 
may be in the top tax bracket
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The results also show that there is a shift in dividend yield coefficient 
The coefficient increased significantly in France and Germany after the tax law 
change when the tax disadvantage of dividend income increased. The changes 
in the dividend yield coefficient for Australia, Japan and U.S. are insignificant
These results therefore generally support the tax effects hypothesis. 
Countries with higher effective tax rates on dividend income have a positive 
relationship between expected return and dividend yield. This suggests that 
dividends have a negative effect on the value of a firm.
Lintner's partial adjustment model is able to explain the dividend behavior 
of firms in countries other than U.S. The addition of a size variable does not 
add very much to the explanatory power of the regressions even though the 
coefficient of the size variable is significant The calculated payout ratios for 
Australia, France and U.S. are not significantly different from the actual payout 
ratios. The calculated payout ratios for Germany and Japan are lower than the 
actual payout ratios but are within the calculated range of payout ratios.
Australia and Germany have the highest speed of adjustments among the five 
countries suggesting that they adjust their dividend payments very quickly to 
changes in earnings. Brittain’s claim that the use of a cash flow variable 
improves the predictive power of Lintner’s model is not substantiated in this 
study.
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II. Practical Implications for Research Results
The results of this study support the notion that tax policies may have 
significant impact on economic stability and growth through their effects on 
corporate retention or payout France, Japan and Germany increased the tax 
advantage accorded capital gains after the tax law change and the dividend 
payout ratios in these countries decreased even though insignificantly in some 
cases. Australia did not significantly change the tax position of investors and 
there was no significant change in the payout ratios. These results suggest that 
the tax policy instituted by a country may change the dividend pattern of firms if 
there is enough incentives to do so. Countries can therefore use tax policies to 
promote economic growth. A policy that encourages capital gains and 
discourages dividend payments may lead to economic growth.
The results of this study also provide evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that dividends have a negative effect on the value of the firm. The 
implication for wealth maximizing firms is to pay less dividends.
III. Limitations of the Study
The predictions made in this study are based purely on tax 
considerations. The selection of countries that changed their system in the 
period provides a unique opportunity to validate the tax effects hypothesis. 
However, it is still possible that other factors interact with these tax effects.
Another limitation is the length of time. The use of a longer number of
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years is desirable but this is not possible with this study. Other studies have
used fewer number of years.
The third limitation which is common to other studies is that the firms 
used are successful firms who were in operation during the entire nine-year 
period. The study did not allow for failures in the sample but this is usually 
done to allow for continuity.
IV. Suggestions for Further Research
The generally negative effect of dividend policy on the value of a firm 
found in this study needs to be adequately examined by incorporating other 
factors. The tax calculations show that in the absolute sense no dividends 
should be paid in Australia, France, Japan and U.S. because shareholders are 
better off with capital gains than dividend income. Dividends are, however, paid 
in these countries, an indication that there are other factors apart from taxes 
that affect the dividend policy of firms. A more conclusive result may be 
obtained by simultaneously integrating tax effects, information effects and 
agency effects.
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APPENDIX A
These tax calculations are based on the following assumptions:
1. Tax payers are in the top marginal tax bracket
2. Tax payers are in the top capital gains tax bracket
3. Tax payers only face federal government tax
Notations:
T is the corporate tax rate on distributed profit,
T* is the corporate tax rate on retained profit,
M is the personal tax rate, 
g is the capital gains tax rate and 
c is the partial credit rate.
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AUSTRALIA BEFORE 1987
Corporate tax rate: 46.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 60.00%
Capital gains tax rate: 60.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = (1 - T)M
Total tax liability = T + (1 - T)M
0.46 + 0.3240
Effective tax rate = 78.40%
Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But 
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = (1-T)g
Total tax liability = T + (1-T)g*
0.46 + 0.3240
Effective tax rate = 78.40%
* In Australia m = g before and after the tax law change.
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate Tax Liability = T
Personal Tax Liability = 0
Total Tax Liability = T
0.46
Effective Tax Rate = 46.0%
AUSTRALIA AFTER 1987
Corporate tax rate: 49.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 48.30%
Personal tax rate on capital gains: 48.30%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = [(1 - T) + T]M - T = (M - 7)
Total tax liability = T + (M - T)
0.49
Effective tax rate = 49.00%
Total tax liability in Australia is M (if M > T) and T (if M < T), but the highest marginal tax 
rate is 48.3% which is less than T. This means that effectively total tax liability is T.
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T
0.49
Effective tax rate — 49.00%
Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And 
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate Tax Liability = T
Personal Tax Lability = 0
Total Tax Lability = T
0.49
Effective Tax Rate = 49.00%
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FRANCE BEFORE THE 1989 TAX LAW CHANGE
Corporate tax rate: 50.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 57.90%
Personal tax rate on capital gains: 15.00%
Partial credit rate: 50.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = [(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T)
[M + Me - c][1 - TJ
Total tax liability = T + [M + Me - c][1 -7]
0.50 + 0.1843
Effective tax rate = 68.43%
Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But 
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = (1 -7)g*
Total tax liability = T + (1-T)g
0.50 + 0.075
Effective Tax Rate = 57.50%
The 15% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if the proceeds from the sale 
of shares exceed FF251.500 (equivalent to $41,508 in 1988) per year or if the shareholder 
holds more than 25% of the shares in a company. However, if the capital gains taxes are not 
paid this will not change the hypothesis because It wOl only affect the realized capital gains 
option.
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate Tax Lability = T
Personal Tax Lability = 0
Total Tax Lability = T
0.50
Effective Tax Rate = 50.00%
FRANCE AFTER THE 1989 TAX LAW CHANGE
Corporate tax rate on distributed profit: 42.00%
Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T*): 34.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 57.90%
Personal tax rate on capital gains: 18.10%
Partial credit rate: 50.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = [(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T)
[M + Me - c][1 - T]
Total tax liability = T + [M + Me - c][1 -T|
0.42 + 0.2137
Effective tax rate = 63.37%
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability = T*
Personal tax liability = (1 -T^g
Total tax liability = T* + (1-T*)g*
0.34 + 0.1195
Effective tax rate = 45.95%
Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And 
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability = T”
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T*
0.34
Effective tax rate = 34.00%
The 18.1% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if the proceeds from the 
sale of shares exceed FF307.600 (equivalent to $53,246 in 1989) per year or if the 
shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares in a company.
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GERMANY BEFORE 1990
Corporate tax rate on distributed profit: 36.00%
Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T*): 56.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 56.00%
Personal tax rate on capital gains: 0.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = [ (1 -T )+ 7 ]M -T
M -T
Total tax liability = T + (M - T)
M
0.56
Effective tax rate = 56.00%
Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But 
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability = T*
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T*
0.56
Effective tax rate = 56.00%
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability = T°
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T*
56
Effective tax rate = 56.00%
GERMANY AFTER THE TAX LAW CHANGE
Corporate tax rate on distributed profit: 36.00%
Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T8): 50.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 53.00%
Persona] tax rate on capital gains: 0.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability: = [(1 - T) + T]M - T
M -T
Total tax liability = T + (M - T)
M
0.53
Effective tax rate = 53.00%
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability = 7*
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T8
0.50
Effective tax rate = 50.00%
Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And 
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability = T*
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T*
0.50
Effective tax rate = 50.00%
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JAPAN BEFORE APRIL 1990
Corporate tax rate on distributed profit: 32.00%
Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T*): 42.00%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 57.00%
Personal tax rate on capital gains: 0.00%
Partial credit rate: 5.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
(1-T)M - c(1-T) 
(M - c)(1-T)
T + (M - c)0 -T) 
0.32 + 0.3536
67.36%
Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But 
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
f*
0
T*
0.42
42.00%
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability = T*
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T*
0.42
Effective tax rate = 42.00%
JAPAN AFTER APRIL 1990
Corporate tax rate: 37.50%
Personal tax rate on dividends: 35.00%
Personal tax rate on capital gains: 20.00%*
Partial credit rate: 5.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = [(1-T)]M - c(1-T)
= (M-c)(1--Q
Total tax liability = T + (M - c)(1 -T)
0.375 + 0.1875
Effective tax rate = 56.25%
*The 20% capital gains tax rate in Japan is a flat rate.
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
T
= (1 -T)g
= T + (1-T)g
0.375 + 0.125
50.00%
Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And 
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability = T
Personal tax liability = 0
Total tax liability = T
0.375
Effective tax rate = 37.50%
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U.S. BEFORE 1986
Corporate tax rate:
Personal tax rate on dividends: 
Capital gains tax rate:
Scenario 1: All Corporate Eai 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability:
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
46.00%
50.00%
20.00%
Are Paid Out To Shareholders
T
(1 - T)M
T + (1 -T)M 
0.46 + 0.27
73.00%
Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But 
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
T
(1-T)g
T + (1 -T)g 
0.46 + 0.108
56.80%
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
T
0
T
0.46
46.0%
U.S. AFTER 1986
Corporate tax rate:
Personal tax rate on dividends: 
Capital gains tax rate:
34.00%
31.00%
31.00%
Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders 
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
T
(1 - T)M
T + (1 - T)M 
0.34 + 0.2046
Effective tax rate 54.46%
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate Tax Liability T
Personal Tax Liability = 0-T)g
Total Tax Lability = T + (1 -T)g
0.34 + 0.2046
Effective Tax Rate 54.46%
Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And 
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability 
Personal tax liability 
Total tax liability
Effective tax rate
T
0
= ' T 
0.34
34.0%
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